

THE
ART
OF
Knowing Ones-Self:
OR, A
DILIGENT SEARCH
INTO
The Springs of Morality.

The Second Part,

Wherein is sought,

*The Spring of our Corruption, Self-Love
is Treated of, the Force of its Indear-
ments, the Extent of its Affections, and
its Irregularities in General, and in
Particular.*

Translated out of French.

L O N D O N,

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Knowing Ones Self:
OR, A
DILIGENT SEARCH
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The Second Part.

The Spring of our Corruption, Self-Love
is traced of the Force of its Influence
showing the Extent of its Operation, and
its Prevalence in General, and in
Particular.

By the Author of the First.

LONDON,
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St. Dunstons Church-yard, 1692.

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T H E

THE
ART
OF

Knowing ones Self, &c.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

Wherein is sought the Spring of our Corruption, in Treating of the first of our Faculties, which is the Understanding.

WE do not believe, that the common Definition of the Understanding and of the Will, of the Judgment and of the Heart, or of the Reason and of the Appetite, as they speak of in the Schools, are proper to render our Notions more distinct; but must follow a
B Custom

Custom too much received. They call Understanding, Judgment or Reason, our *Soul*, being it knoweth; that is, it conceiveth, judgeth, reasoneth, remembreth, reflecteth, and despiseth its Knowledge in a certain Order. They call Heart, or Will, or Appetite, the *Soul*, because it hath Affections of Love, or Hatred, of Desire, of Fear, of Joy, of Sadness, of Hope, or of Despair, &c. They might perhaps, without too much deviating from the Truth, define the Judgment *the Soul*, because it *understandeth*; and the Heart *the Soul*, because it *loveth*; for as the Conceptions, the Judgments, the Reasonings, are but the several manners of Knowledge, 'tis also certain that Desire, Fear, Hope, and generally all our other Affections are but the several manners of Love; but it is not on that at present we are to stop.

It is necessary here to know, whether the Source of our Corruption is in the Judgment, or in the Heart; whether in the Knowledge of the Soul, or in its Affections, be the Spring of our Failings. They answer, that it is not in the Judgment, since if it were, we must allow the Judgment to be govern'd by the Heart, instead of the Heart being govern'd by the Judgment; for it would be unreasonable, that this which is least corruptible should

be

be govern'd by that which is most irregular, or that we should draw the Rule of our Conduct from the Source of our Corruption; for if it were so, a Man ought not to govern himself by his Reason, before he hath a certain Assurance that God in an extraordinary manner hath enlightened him, and must wait for an Enthusiasm ere he can have the right to act in quality of a reasonable Creature.

Likewise the Holy Scripture always attributes the Overshadowings of the Judgment to the Evil Affections of the Heart. *If our Gospel is hid, (saith St. Paul,) it is hid to those who shall perish, to whom the God of this World hath blinded the Understanding.* It is easie to understand, that by the God of this World, he means the Devil of Concupiscence. 'Tis somewhat like this that Christ said to the Jews, *How can ye believe, since that ye seek Glory one of another?* It is certain, that if the Depravation were originally in the Judgment, it would carry its natural Darkness through all. It would be blind in the Study of Sciences, as it is in that of Religion, and it would succeed no better in the knowledge of indifferent Objects, aboye all when they are difficult, then of those pertaining to it. When an Eye is covered with a Film, or shut by an Obstruction, it

is no more in a condition of discerning one Object than another: But when its Darkness springs from the Obstacle of a Cloud, a Mist, or any other exterior Vail, it is more easie to perceive the Objects at distance; and it shall see altogether clear when the strange Obstacle shall be taken away, without receiving any Change in it self. Let us say the same, That if the Understanding were naturally darken'd in it self, it would wander in the Knowledges of Curiosity, as in those of its Interest, for it would carry its Darkness through all: But because it is covered but with Mists, which arise from the Seat of Affections, we must not wonder if when the Passion ceases its Darkness is removed.

This last is of common Experience. A Man who shall have a rightness of Wit, and an admirable exactness of Reason, for to comprehend that which is most occult and intricate in the Sciences who knows to doubt of Things doubtful, to affirm the True, to deny the false, to have a simple Opinion of Probables, to demonstrate those which are Certain, who will not take the False for the True, nor one degree of Truth for another; has no sooner an Affair of Interest with any one, but the trueness of his Judgment or Spirit quits

him, his Reason leans to the Will of his Desires, and the Evidence confounds it self with his Profit. Whence comes these Darkneses? From the Objects? No; for the Objects are abundance more easie in this Affair, than they were in those high Sciences which he so well penetrated. From any natural Default of his Judgment? Still less; he has reasoned perfectly well upon the Matters of Speculation; cause him to speak of Affairs, provided they be the Affairs of another, he will reason with the same justness.

But if after having brought the Judgment of this Man from the Objects of Sciences to the Affairs of Life, you should call it back from these to the consideration of the Truths of Religion; you will find it may be his Judgment still more falls, and more subject to Illusions; it is because a greater Interest produces likewise a greater Deviation. A Passion, as Interest, is very strong to darken Reason; but all the Passions which oppose Reason, are still more capable of producing this bad effect. So that it is not as we imagine commonly, the degree of Darkness which is originally in the Understanding, which produces the number of our Passions; but it is the number and the vehemence of the Evil Passions of our Heart, which make the degree of

this Darkness, which is in the Understanding.

That if the Understanding were originally darken'd, it could not be heal'd, but by an infusion of new and extraordinary Light, which is contrary to Experience; for the Understanding of a Sinner who comes to repent of his Sins, is not filled with other Ideas, and other Knowledge, than those that he had before: I speak in the ordinary course of Things; a Man after his Conversion has the Ideas of God, of Salvation, and Eternity; he is convinced of his Mortality, and of the Frailty of Human Things; he looks upon Piety as a Means very proper for to live in Repose, for to die with Consolation, and for to live again even after Death.

But he was perswaded of all these Truths before his Repentance; (for I suppose he sinned not as an Infidel,) he has not then acquired any new Knowledge, but his Knowledge is become from Speculative, as it was to Practical. It is so, that which *Jesus Christ* testifies in some part, when he declares to his Enemies, that they would be less culpable, if they had had less knowledge. It is certain in effect, that the want of Light excuses a Man of the Faults which he commits, when the Fault is of Necessity, and Involuntary. For why should

Knowing ones Self.

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Should any one be Reproached for not seeing that which it is impossible for him to see in effect? Likewise a Man cannot be pardon'd whom we suppose not to be blind, but because he will be so. He that deceives himself by the Heart, and not by a natural default of Light, sees and sees not; he has knowledge enough for to perceive, that he followeth not that which he hath. It is by that means alone it appears to us, that we can reconcile two Expressions of Scripture, which appear very opposite; for one while it accuses the Sinner of Ignorance, of Folly, of Stupidity, of Blindness, of walking in Darkness, of not knowing what he does; and by and by it reprehends him for sinning against his Light, for resisting the Truth which enlightens him to be condemned by his own Thoughts, and reprov'd by his Conscience, &c. All these Expressions are true, and are not opposite but in appearance; the Sinner seeth and seeth not, he sees by the Understanding which God has given him, capable to perceive the Truth, and guide him: He sees not by his Heart, which sends into the uppermost parts of our Soul continual Clouds, which darken our Understanding.

I know very well that they distinguish in the School two sorts of Knowledge or

Light, when they go about to satisfy this Difficulty; the first which they name *Speculative*, and the second which they name *Practical*; they define them so by their Effects. For the *Speculative* Light is that which does but swim (as I may say) in the Understanding, that is to say, that which stops itself at the Simple Contemplation; whereas we understand by the *Practical* Knowledge, that which stops not in the Judgment, but which descends into the Heart, which gains the Will, which masters the Affections, and disposes into Practice what it orders us. But it must be granted, that we go not far in the Discovery of Things by the help of this Distinction, because in effect it says nothing else, but that there are in us an effectual Knowledge, and others which remain without effect. If we look on it near, we shall find, that Knowledge is commonly *Speculative*, or *Practical*, according as it interestes, or as it interestes not our Heart. When we consider the Truth in the Sciences, we have but ordinarily a *Speculative* Knowledge; but when we consider it in Objects that interest us, such as are the Affairs of Civil Life, or the Matters of Religion, we hate it if it be grievous, or we love it if it be agreeable, and leads us to the Action, or avoiding, according as it bears the one

or the other of these two Characters. This is that which is called *Practical* in the School, it is a Truth that has some strength. Now Truth draws always its strength out of our Hearts; in effect it is of the Light of the Understanding, as of that of Nature: It lights all, but it moves nothing by it self; it has a shining, but it has no force; it can guide us, but it cannot sustain us. Men look on the Decisions of Reason, when none but it speaks, either as Dreams, or as dry Truths, which are worth nothing but to be forgot; they consider them as the importunate Counsels of a Pedant, who fatigues them with Remonstrances out of season. If Men would determine according to Reason, Philosophers would persuade sooner than Orators; for the first have an exact Reason, and a good severe Sense, which weighs and examines all Things, and then makes just comparison; whereas the others often abound in Fictions, in Lies, and in Figures, which would be but pompous and magnificent Impostures, if necessity did not justify these excesses of Language, and if Men had not agreed to abate of their Signification: But because they determine by their Affections, it happens contrary to Reason, that Orators persuade generally a great deal better than

than Philosophers, because the Soul does not weigh the Reasons, but its Interest; and that it weighs not the Light, but only its Profit. The Good draws us, the Evil makes us fly; Reason it self does neither the one nor the other; but it is only in as much as it makes us perceive the Objects. And here, in passing by, we may know the Error of those who make the free Arbitriment of Man to consist in the indifference of his Soul, in carrying or in not carrying him towards the Good which is presented him. In truth this indifference is but in their Imaginations, it is not in their Objects; the Good is not indifferent to be good, or the Bad indifferent to be bad. It is not in the Reason, for it is not free to consent to, that which appears false to it, or to reject the Truth: It is not indifferent to judge, that That which appears an Evil to it, is a Good; and, that That which appears a Good to it, is an Evil. The Soul is not indifferent to love or to hate that which it conceives for its Good; for if that were, it would be indifferent to the loving or hating it self, which is contrary to Nature.

C H A P. II.

*Wherein is continued to be shown, That
the Spring of our Corruption is not in
the Understanding.*

WHEN we say, that the Corruption of the Understanding comes from the Will; we do not pretend to advance, that all our Ignorances, and that all our Errors, without Exceptions should have their Spring in our Affections. For as for the first, it is certain that they are not all to be considered as Faults; it appertains not to Men, nor to Angels, nor in general unto Creatures, how noble soever they may be, to know all Things; it is the Character of the Supream Being, and of the Infinite Understanding, which governs the Universe. In general, we ought to count for nothing, all Ignorance which comes, either from that our Nature is too much bounded, or from that the Object is too much elevated, or from the brevity of our Life, which is not sufficient for our knowledge of all Things, &c. for it is not a Crime to our Bodies not to be
Im-

Immortal, and it is not to our Understanding not to be Infinite.

It is not the Ignorance of the Mysteries of Nature, or of the Secrets of Providence, which can be look'd upon as the Corruption of the Understanding; *Jesus Christ* was the Model of Perfection, and nevertheless he knew not all Things, as Man, because he knew not the Day of Judgment. That which causes the Corruption of our Understanding, is the Ignorance of our Duties; it is that of our Sins, it is that of Benefits which we have received; Ignorance which proceeds not from any defect of Light, and which cannot be justified in any manner. It is not likewise the Errors of Speculation, which ought to be look'd upon as the Vices of the Understanding; they are so small, that God has often left them in the Souls which he has enlighten'd with his Revelation in an immediate and extraordinary manner: For we find not that *Moses*, nor the Prophets, had any other Ideas of the Sun, the Stars, the Earth, &c. than those that the Vulgar may have; and it was not necessary likewise, that God should make Philosophers by Revelation, those whom he destin'd to the Instruction of the most Simple Men.

At bottom it is no great matter if the ordinary Man deceives himself, in representing the Stars as Flambeaus: But it is a great Irregularity that the Sages, who had so just Ideas of the Grandeur of the Heavenly Bodies, should look upon Eternity, God, and Religion, as if they were but Points, or rather Shadows and Appearances at a distance. Our Reason may be enlighten'd with the first Prejudication, but it cannot but be blinded by the second.

As to the rest, nothing is more easie than to justify the Judgment, and to shew that it is not the first Spring of our Corruption, in examining its different ways of Knowledge. For to begin; by the simple Conceptions of the Understanding, there is not an Idea in our Soul which is Evil in that it is an Idea, that is to say, in that it represents an Object to us; the Objects of Pleasure, of Glory, and of Sin it self, have nothing Criminal in themselves, because it is permitted to know these Objects. The same thing must be said of the Judgments of the Soul, and of its Reasonings. The first Notions are not Criminal, because they are even of so great and easie an Evidence, that so soon as the Mind reasons, it perceives them. The Reasoning is a sort of Knowledge which

which we acquire, and which will not deceive us, if not assisted by the Heart; for we are wont to say, that common Sense deceives no Man; for to shew that Man naturally, reasons well.

Nevertheless we must mark in passing by, that in the order of our Knowledge the Ideas have more force for to determine our Will, than the Judgments or the Reasonings of the Mind, which is true generally speaking. The reason is, because that our Knowledge, as we have already remark'd, has not force of it self; it borrows all the Affections of the Heart. Thence it comes that Men seldom persuade, but when they cause to enter (as I may say) the Sentiment in their Reasons, or in their Knowledge: But in the Reasons you cannot make enter but a distanc'd Good; for because you are obliged for to make use of Reasoning for to make it know, it is evident that it is not altogether near; whereas the Idea participating of the quality of its Object, and being sad or agreeable according as the Object is one or the other, it makes you sensibly know by it self, that which Reasoning makes you only expect. But it is not there the Spring of Evil; the Irregularities come from that, that the Spiritual Ideas make not near the Impressions upon our Souls.

Souls, which the Corporal Ideas do, which flow to us through the Canal of Sense. Nevertheless it is but just that they should make greater, because that the Sentiment of the Soul ought to be more lively than that of strange Objects; and that the Experience of Spiritual Things should touch us nearer than the Knowledge of Sense, which interestes us only in that which is about us. The Corporal Ideas which seem to be designed but for the good of the Body which they guide; whereas the Spiritual Ideas ought to direct our Souls, and conduct them to the Springs of their Happiness: So that in as much as our Souls are more precious than our Bodies, so much likewise the Spiritual Ideas are naturally more important than the Corporeal; and as they are more necessary, they ought likewise naturally to make a stronger Impression.

As Ideas are a sort of Sentiment, being agreeable or grievous according to the Characters of the Things they represent, because they participate of the Quality of their Objects; it may be said without deceit, that they belong in some sort to the Affections, or to the Sentiments of our Soul, which are either the Corporal Sentiments as the Sensations, or the Spiritual Sentiments as the Affections of the Heart.

Heart. So that in saying, that the Corruption of Man begins, because that the Corporal Ideas make too lively and too strong an Impression on the Soul, we say nothing in opposition to our Principle, that the Corruption of our Reason comes from that of our Heart.

C H A P. III.

Wherein is sought, the manner of the Minds deceiving the Heart.

THIS Impostor of the Heart which deceives the Mind, does it by voluntary Inapplications, by affected Distractions, by Ignorances where it pleases, by Errors which spring from the great Desires which we have of deceiving our selves, and by the bent which sets our Mind at distance from all that which is Afflicting, and which ties it strongly to all that which is Pleasing.

The first Thing then that our Heart does, is for to fill us with unprofitable Objects, for to draw us from that the Consideration whereof would import us; but then the Sight is afflicting for us. We find amongst others two Ideas in our Soul, which

which we fear above all others, which are the Idea of our Misery, and that of our Duty. The Idea of our Misery comprehends that of the Frailty of the World, and our own Mortality; that of our Sins, and the Justice of God; that of our Vices, and our Weaknesses; and of the Shame which naturally follows them. The Idea of our Duty comprehends a thousand grievous Obligations for a voluptuous Soul as ours, sad for a Heart which nothing touches but Pleasure; mortifying for our Pride, and insupportable to Self-Love. By this means Occupations the least binding, the most insipid Diversions, the most barren Knowledge, and the most disagreeable Impleys, become the Object of our Application, or of our Search, as if they could make our Happiness. Nothing pleases us but what makes us live in Dissipation; every thing which makes the Time pass insensibly away, which keeps us in ignorance of our selves, charms us. Mind the Gamester, who passes his whole Life in a continued course from Joy to Sadness, from Hope to Fear; He who should take from him the turbulent Succession of his Thoughts, and of his divers Agitations, would take from him assuredly the Pleasure of Life. But be not surprized at it, this Agitation impleys him, and it is enough;

he thinks himself happy, provided he can but dispence with reflecting on his Misery. On the other side, Hope flatters him even in the midst of his Losses; and his Soul is so flexible to follow always the Sights which are agreeable to it, that when he wins, he thinks that he cannot lose; and when he loses, it fills him with nothing but the hopes of winning. So likewise is it with divers other Professions wherein Men are imployed. The Good and Bad follows each other in its turn, and are link'd, as Experiance does but too well inform us: But our Soul is constant in never fastening its Desires but on that which flatters it; and when it meets with Evil, in stead of Good which it had hoped for, it frames to it self an imaginary Felicity composed of its own Illusions. Give unto an ambitious Man what he demands, place him in the Rank he doth wish for; with difficulty will he acquire any other Advantage than that of conceiving new Hopes, and framing to himself new Impostors. We love War, not as a hazardous Profession, which puts us often in danger; or as an inconvenient Profession, which makes us suffer very much; but because it employs our Mind and our Heart by the extreame variety of Objects which it presents them; and that it answers to
that

that Eternal Agitation of the Soul which shuns it self, and seeks Matter for new Illusions wherewith to feed it self. It is incredible how much the Illusions of the Heart expose themselves in the Affairs of Civil Life. We begin by deceiving our selves; and after that, we deceive others if we can. Believe us not, neither on our Faith, neither on our Probity, neither on our Fidelity a hundred times proved. It is true, that we have the Maxims of Equity and Right in our Minds, which we are wont to respect; but the Corruption which is in our Heart plays with these General Maxims. What imports it that I respect the Law of Justice, if this be but found in that which pleaseth me, or which agrees with me; and if it depends on my Heart to perswade me, that a Thing is just, or that it is not? Trust not your self there, the Virtue and the Justice through all our Actions, which have gained us the Reputation, are without; they appear but to attract your Confidence: But Injustice is in our Hearts for to make Reason act as it shall please, and it hides it self there for to surprize you with the more facility. That which is most sad is, that one Illusion brings forth several others; for as a Heart interessed for to pre-occupy the Judgment in its favour

against the Truth employs I know not how many probable Reasons, but false for to prop its Pretensions, the Soul which affects its Reasons considering them with Pleasure, and often renewing them to it self, and looking on their best side, comes insensibly to take the degree of his Application for the degree of their Evidence, and then it receives them as certain Maxims; it makes Prejudices, which being false, and supposed constantly as true, become to it an Eternal Spring of Illusion and Error: Add thereunto, that when in an Affair we have prepossess'd our selves unto our Advantage against any one, the Hatred that we have to his Pretension makes us condemn all his Reasons, and all them who have any relation with those whom he has imployed to defend his Cause; as it is seen, that the Hatred which we have conceived against a Man who is our Enemy, will make us hate an indifferent Person, if he have but any Lines of Conformity with him; and I leave you to judge what Influences these Prejudices have afterwards upon our Actions, and upon our Conduct.

But to come back to our voluntary Distractions and Dissipations. Nothing in my Opinion is more extraordinary than the Proceeding of *Democritus*, who, after ha-

ving judged the Affairs of the *Abdenites* for a long time with an Exactness and Judgment wherewith all the World was charmed, looking upon this as a base Occupation, and willing to live for himself, he abandons the Society of Men, and retires into a Desert for to tie himself to the Study of Wisdom, and to the Knowledge of Himself, where *Hypocrates*, who thought to come and heal him of his Madness which all the World thought him possess'd with, found him employ'd in mocking the Extravagancies of Human kind.

There is no Character of a Hero so surprising as that of a Man, who dare sustain the sight of himself. It is true, that the Retreat of our Philosopher got him the Esteem of the Sages, of whom he made more accompt than of the Vulgar: He was, it may be, sustained in this Design by the desire of making himself talk'd of; it may be, that the Approbation of the *Abdenites* did not appear considerable enough unto his Soul passionately for Vain-glory: In that case he is not so much alone as we may imagine; he quits not the Society of the *Abdenites*, but for to be in better Company; and he retires not into the Country, and into the Desert, but for to be more in the sight of Human kind.

There is hardly any thing less reasonable than the Discourse of *Cynus* to *Pyrrhus*, which the History relates as full of Wisdom; (rest your self without going so far.) This Man, did he imagin that Repose was so easily to be used? *Pyrrhus* would have sooner beaten the *Romans*, subjected *Italy*, *Cicily*, and *Carthage*, than he would have conquered the Repugnance which his Heart naturally had to Repose; let this Importune counsel him, because that this Repose suffereth him not to go out of himself, as he wisheth.

The greatest part of Philosophers having found the Study of Man something too painful, have cast themselves on the barren Contemplations of Nature; there they have found Charms on one side because they possess them, and on the other side because they distinguish them from other Men: For to say by the by, it is an Error to say, that our Soul loves the Truth, in that it is Truth; there are no greater nor no more certain Truths, than the Truths which all the World knows; nevertheless there are none more indifferent. Whence comes that? It is because the Truth doth not appear to us amiable enough for it self, but only in as much as it can distinguish us.

Thus

Thus if the Sages themselves frame an Eternal Illusion by the Effort of their Passions, it may be imagined that the ordinary sort of Men is not exempt from the voluntary Darkneses of their Hearts: Every Passion has a particular Impostor. The Passions formerly framed unto themselves a Religion agreeable to them; it was the Pagan Religion. They could not do altogether the same thing in the Sunshine of Christianity: Nevertheless they do what they can for it; and if they do not intirely succeed, they want but little of obtaining their Ends, they do so prodigiously disguise the Holy Religion which *Jesus Christ* has brought into the World, and which declares War against all the Passions. It is certain, that all the Vices have each its Moral; there is one Moral of Interest, one Moral of Pride, one Moral of Voluptuousness, one Moral of Vengeance, &c. according as these Sights point their Maxims in our Understanding. We must not be then surpris'd, because that when the Truth appears to light us, the Heart rejects it, and sends it back, telling it almost the same thing which *Felix* said to *Saul*; (*For this time get thee gone, and when I shall have an opportunity I will call thee back;*) Nevertheless the Heart takes great care, that this Truth shall not come to

represent it self so easily; for that it may not hear its Voice, it fills it self with the Noise of the World; and that it may not be obliged to consider that which it so soverainly imports it to know, it fills it self with a thousand Objects, the knowledge whereof is unprofitable to it.

Sometimes it is forced to make a comparison between two Objects, one whereof is the Object of a Legitimate and Reasonable Desire, and another an Object of Temptation and Irregularity; it must take one part, Reason is called for to judge, and to decide. But with what Partiality does it acquit it self of its Duty? If there be ten degrees of Evidence in the Object of Duty, the Soul perceives scarce two; the others are hid from it, because that they manifest not themselves but in a particular Examination which the Soul is apprehensive of, and which it never makes but against its own Will. On the contrary, the Object of Temptation appears to it in a full-Light, it turns it on all Sides, it sets it self against all its Faces, because that this Consideration ties it more agreeably; the Soul is inventive in finding favourable Reasons unto its Desire, because that every one of these Reasons gives it a sensible Pleasure; it is on the contrary very slow to perceive those which are contrary, although

although they were never so plain, because that it is sorry to find that which it looks not for, and that it conceives ill that which it receives not, but with Regret. So the Heart breaking the Reflexions of the Mind when it pleases, turning away its Thought to the side that favours its Passion, comparing Things in the sense that it pleases, voluntarily forgetting that which opposes it self to its Desires, having but cold and languishing Perceptions of its Duty; conceiving on the contrary with Indearment, with Pleasure, with Ardor, and, as often as it is possible, all that which favours its Bents, it is not to be wondred at if it play with the Lights of its Understanding; and if it finds that, we judge of Things, not according to Truth, but according to our Inclinations.

C H A P.

CHAP. IV.

Wherein is considered, the Commerce of Illusion which is between the Heart and the Judgment, and how God alone destroys it by his Grace.

IT might be thought, That if the Heart corrupted this Judgment, the Judgment filled with false Prejudices should in its turn corrupt the Heart, in returning it Darkness, and nourishing it with Errors which it hath received.

In this State it is easie to conceive, that the Corruption of Man cannot be cured by Natural Remedies: For in this Eternal Circle of Illusions and Wandrings, which makes the Judgment deceive the Heart, and the Heart deceive the Judgment; from whence can come the Light, and the Truth? If you would enlighten the Reason of Man, the Affections reject that Evidence which you present them; if you undertake to correct the Irregularity of these Affections, you find that you cannot but in making the Soul see in what Wandrings and what Precipices it is engaged, which it cannot do unless it be

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inlightned. So that the Heart cannot be corrected but by the Reason, the Reason cannot be inlightned but by the Commerce which it hath with the Heart. What is it that shall remedy this Disorder. Invent, set your Judgment and Imagination at work? You shall find no other Cause capable to produce the Effect, than God himself acting by his Grace.

Then in that it is reasonable to think, that God, who knows so perfectly the Spring of our Evil, begins our Cure by correcting the Default from whence all the other proceed. We have already said, that the first Root of this Disorder consists in that, That the Imagination acts more lively in us than Reason; that is to say, that the Corporal Ideas make a strong and lively Impression in our Soul, while the Spiritual Ideas make them but faint and languishing. It is easie to conceive, to the end that God may re-establish our Soul in the right State where it ought to be in that regard, he must cause by his Grace, that the Spiritual Ideas of our Duty, of Virtue, of Eternity, &c. do make a more lively and strong Impression than they were accustomed to make; and that on the contrary, the Images of the World, of Pleasure, of Voluptuousness, and in general of all sensible

sible Goods, should make an Impression less lively and strong.

God does the first in fixing the Spiritual Ideas in the Judgment, in the second place in rendering them agreeable, and in the third in extending them. Grace fixes good Ideas in our Judgment, as Melancholy fixes Melancholy Ideas in the Soul. A melancholy Man cannot drive from his Judgment all the grievous Ideas which afflict it; they return; they follow him every where. So the wholesome Ideas, of which we speak, being fix'd by Grace, we cannot put them from us by the Effort of our Corruption; they return: they represent themselves anew; they reprimand Cupidity, and stop its Overflowings; they prevent even sometimes the Reflexions of our Judgment; for a Man is seen to do good Actions, as by Instinct and without Reflexion, because he follows without perceiving the Ideas which Grace has fix'd in his Understanding. God extends the Spiritual Ideas in fixing them in our Judgment by his Grace; that is to say, that he makes us consider the Spiritual Objects in their just Grandeur, and under their natural Form. Upon which is to be remarked, that the Ideas of Piety having a sort of opposition to the Ideas of the World, the one cannot be extended without contracting the

the other. The Idea of Time hides that of Eternity; that of Eternity contracts that of Time.

As it is the Pleasure that Self-Love makes us, takes to consider the Ideas of the World, which extends them, and fixes them in our Imagination, the Soul making bigger, and Eternizing, as much as it can possibly, that which is agreeable to it; so it may be supposed, that Grace causes the good Impressions which the Spiritual Ideas make upon us; that is to say, that it affixes and extends them, in accompanying them with certain Sentiments of ineffable Joy and Consolation, which the Scripture calls one while, *The joy of the Holy Ghost*; and another while, *The Peace of God which passeth all Understanding*: As the Judgment applied by our Passions unto Corporal Ideas may be called in some sort the Understanding of the Man that perishes, the Judgment applied by the Grace of God unto Spiritual Ideas may be called with just reason, the Understanding of the Immortal Man. The difference which is between one and the other, is extream; the one deceives it self almost ever, the other hardly ever deceives it self at all; for as our Errors, at least our dangerous Errors, have their Spring in the violence of our Passions, and that these Passions cannot

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but be very moderate in a Man who guides himself by the sight of Eternity, and not by that of Temporal Things; one may judge, that this Man is not subject to the Illusions which generally deceive us.

The Immortal Man finding himself Glorious in his Nature, Blessed in the State which Religion proposes to him, and elevated above Time, and the World by Nature and by Religion, has nothing to do to fly the sight of himself, nor to fear being afflicted by the consideration of his End.

Diversions are not for his use, at least such Diversions as the Man of the World wisheth for: For he does not only seek after the Refreshment of his Body, and the Recreation of his Mind; there would be nothing but what were reasonable in this Design; but he seeks after every thing that may imploy him, and hinder him from seeing himself. That which shews it is, that after the Repose and the Refreshment he seeks still for Diversion, and finds therein Charms so much the greater, that he cannot be one moment given up to himself without a most frightful Trouble, which comes from this, That the Weight of what is past, which is no more for him but an Object of Regret, and what's to come he looks upon as an Object of Doubt

and Incertitude, joyn'd together for to load his Heart with all their Weights, and to plunge it in the sad Reflexions of an inevitable Misery. But the Immortal Man looks upon, as a matter of Trouble, every thing that can make him go out of himself, and is angry with the importunate Vails which hide him from his Grandeur, and with the Objects which suspend the Joy which he finds in knowing himself well.

The Immortal Man deceives not himself by Sentiment, his Passions are moderated, because he cannot take but a small part of Things, which have so little relation to the extent of his Durance; and he sees all with clearness, because he considers all Things with indifference. Pride possesses him not; Men do not value being esteemed in a Place where they abide but an instant; he suffers not himself to be prepossess'd by Interest; his Reason is not Partial for his Avarice, because he hath found an infinite Interest to prepossess himself with all.

And certainly it may be said, that it appertains not but to him for to have good Sense and Prudence. Let a Man be able to gain Riches, to conquer or to govern Provinces: If he knows no more than that, he is void of Sense; he has form'd an Edifice with a great deal of Reason,

Reason, but he has laid the Foundation on the Sand.

The Men of the World are wise enough in the choice of the Means which they use for to succeed in their Designs; but they are the most senseless in the choice of the End which they propose to themselves. It appertains not but to the immortal Man to be equally wise in the choice of the End, and that of the Means, and by consequence there is no justness of Judgment, of Right, of Reason, of good Sense and Prudence, but in the latter.

The Gospel furnishes us with an illustrious Example of this Elevation in the Person of *Jesus Christ*, in whom we find not only an Immortal Man, but likewise the Prince of Immortality. One is almost equally surpris'd to find him a God, who creeps upon the Earth, and converses among Men; and a Man, who is always in Heaven, and elevated above all Temporal Things. Consider the pure and lively manner with which his Disciples relate to you his Doctrine, his Actions, and the divers Circumstances of his Life, and you will be perswaded, that they had not a design to make a Picture of their Divine Master that should flatter; for certainly it may be said, that those poor People did not know even well enough the height of

of Manners, for to succeed in making a counterfeit Picture of him. Nevertheless we must agree, that *Jesus Christ*, of whom they make us the History without Study, and without Art, makes appear an Elevation till then unknown: For see here the first who acts and speaks as an Immortal Man, and who teaches Men to govern themselves by the prospect of Eternity; he seeks not that which may draw him from the Duties of his Charge, or to divert him from thinking of Himself; he spends the Days in Instructing the Flocks, and the Nights in Praying to God. That which makes the ordinary Object of the Envy of Men, makes that of his Disdain; he is not ambitious of the Esteem of any Man; he does not thrust himself nigh unto those who are able to do him good; he has no base Indulgence, nor false Complaisance for any Man whatever. One would say, That he knew not Nature, but for to take the Emblems, which he made use of for to lead Men unto God. His Friends are not those who have any Temporal Proximity with him, but those with whom he has relation in God; that is to say, those who are truly his Disciples, and who do the Will of his Heavenly Father. He defines the Foolish and the Wise Man, not by an Hability that is included

in this Life, but by an Hability which tends to an infinite and incorruptible Good. His Desires, his Fears, his Angers, his Thoughts, his Discourses, his Works, his Occupations, his Indearments, go to Eternity, and stop not at Time, but so much as is necessary for to set at liberty other Men.

So likewise may we say, That when the intimate Commerce that he had with his Eternal Father should not fill his Spirit with Supernatural Lights, his Holiness, which disengaged him from the Commerce of Creatures, would suffice for to hinder him from being subject to the Illusions which deceive ordinary Men.

But having considered the first of our Faculties, and seen that it is not in our Judgment, that is, the first Spring of our Corruption, we must consider the Heart, which is the Soul in as much as it loves, that is to say, the Seat of our Affections.

CHAP. V.

Wherein is continued, the Search after the Springs of our Corruptions, in considering the Motions and the Bents of our Hearts.

AS there are in our Mind the first Notions which are of an infallible Truth, and which makes this bottom of natural Light, which not only doth never deceive us, but which puts us in a State of coming back from our Errors: There are likewise in our Hearts primary Affections which are necessarily lawful, Sentiments, without which the Nature of Man could not be, and which not only do not contain Corruption in themselves, but which serve us when they are well guided to make us come back from our Vices. Such is the Natural Love of Esteem, the Love of our Selves, the Care of our Preservation, the Desire of our Happiness. In themselves these Passions are good, because that they relate naturally to the Good of Man. There are two sorts, the one which the Scholasticks call *Prosequeutive*, because they carry us towards Good; the

other which they call *Aversativa*, because they set us at distance from Evil. But as they tend to our Advantage by the intention of Nature, it is very certain that they relate to our Loss by an effect of our Corruption, and that arrives then when false Goods cause to spring in our Hearts true Affections; then when we go but slowly towards that which merits all the Ties of our Soul, and that on the contrary we desire, with all the Ardor that we are capable of, the Goods which merit but an indifferent Tie; for then we overthrow all Things, for we change the End into Means, and the Means into End; we precipitate our selves in our Actions; we wander in our Conduct; and it is found, that the shadow of Good makes us lose the Spring, and for to run after Appearances we lose the Truth. From thence spring all our Vices, to the search whereof we ought to apply our selves, because it is they that do make the corruption of our Heart.

Then when we seek for the Spring of our Irregularities, it is certain that we must not stop at any one of them in particular, unless it influences over all the others. It is evident, that the Root of our natural Evil doth not consist in any particular disposition of Temperament,

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because that they who have a Temperament opposite unto that, cease not being corrupted. It is not Interest which is the Principle of our Evil, because that ordinarily it hath something that is incompatible with Pride. It is not Pride, because that is in some sort opposite to Interest.

Nevertheless it is certain, that there are some Things in which the Vices are opposite, and some Things in which they agree : They are opposite in some Things, because that the one is in some sort the Remedy of the other ; they agree in some Things, because that the Soul that is fallen into one, has still a Bent for the other, which seems so opposite to it.

It is a Truth which will appear to us yet more clear, if we set our selves to make here (if I may so say) the Anatomy of the Heart, in entring upon the dividing of its Passions. Theft springs from Injustice, Injustice from Interest, and Interest from the Irregular Love that we have for our selves. Conceitedness is but a Lie which Self-love makes us have for our own Imaginations. Pride is but the Drunkenness of Self-love, which represents us to our own Imaginations greater and more perfect than we are. Vengeance is but a desire to defend ones self against those who hate us, or to satisfie

ones self in punishing those who have offended us. In a word, consider well all the Vices, and all the Passions of Man, you will find in the end Self-love; it is that which gives them their Birth, because that all the Motives of Vice are taken from that, that we seek that which flatters us, and relates to This Self, which holds the first Place amongst the Objects of our Knowledge and our Affections: It is that which makes them live, and which makes them die; for when two Passions oppose with violence each other, Fear, for Example, on one side, and Vengeance on the other, the Soul retires into it self, and it consults but Self-love for to know unto which of the two it should abandon it self; and then according as Self-love judges, or judges not, that Vengeance is necessary, it pronounces in favour of Resentment, or of Moderation: So that as it is Self-love that has given Birth to these two Passions, it is Self-love which makes the one live to the prejudice of the other, Then what can be said of a Passion unto which all our irregular Inclinations relate, where all our Vices terminate, which gives them all Birth, which makes them all Die, which stops and suspends them all, but that it ought to be without difficulty the general Irregularity which is the Spring of others,

others, and which we have said to be the first Root of our Evil, and of our Corruption.

That which confirms us in this Opinion is, That at the same time that it is perceived that all the Vices flatter Self-love, it is found that all the Vices agree to oppose the same. Humility abuses it; Temperance mortifies it; Liberality strips it; Moderation discontents it; Valor exposes it; Magnanimity, Zeal, and Piety, sacrifice it.

It may be said likewise, that Self-love enters so Essentially into the definition of Vices and Virtues, that without it one could not conceive either the one or the other.

In general, Vice is a preference of ones self before others; and Virtue seems to be a preference of others before ones self: I say, that it seems to be, because that in effect it is certain, that Virtue is but a manner of loving ones self, a great deal more noble and more sensible than all others.

Then here we seem to find a contradiction in our System; for on one side Self-love appears to us to be the Principle of all our Irregularities; and on the other it is certain, that it is by the love of our selves, that we acquit our selves of our

Duty. Corruption draws all its force from Self-love: God on the other side draws from the Love of our Selves all the Motives, which he makes use of for to carry us to the Study of Sanctification. For what would his Promises and his Threatnings serve for, if God had not a design to interest the Love of our Selves?

This Difficulty vanishes so soon as you shall suppose of the Love of our Selves that which we have already said of the Affections of our Heart in general; that is, that they have something innocent and lawful which belongs unto Nature, and likewise something that is vicious and irregular which belongs to our Corruption. The use of our Tongue is happy in this, for it makes us distinguish between Self-Love, and the Love of our Selves; the Love of our Selves is that Love, in that is lawful and natural; Self-love is this same Love, in that it is vicious and corrupted.

Then as we search here the Spring of our Evil, our Design engages us at present to examine, in what consists the Irregularity of Self-love. This Question is quite singular, but it is not less considerable for that; and I dare say, that few Questions in Morality and Religion are of more importance than this, as I hope it will appear

pear by the Discussion we are now entring into.

C H A P. VI.

Wherein are examined the Faults of the Love of our Selves.

THE Love of our Selves cannot Sin but in excess or in direction; its Irregularity must consist in this, that we love our Selves too much; or in this, that we love Ill; or in the one and in the other of these two Faults joyned together.

The Love of our Selves sins not in excess, that appears from that it is permitted to love ones Self as much as ones Will, when one loves ones Self well. In effect what is this loving ones Self? 'Tis to desire ones Good, 'tis to fear ones Harm, tis to seek ones Happiness. Then I grant that it often happens, that one desires too much, that one fears too much, that one affixes ones self to ones Pleasure, or to that which one looks on as ones chief Happiness with too much Ardor: But take notice, that the Excess comes from the Fault which is in the Object of your Passions, and not from the too great measure of
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of Love of your Self; that which shews it, is that you can; and that you ought likewise to desire without bounds the Supreme Felicity; to fear without bounds the Sovereign Misery; and that there would likewise be an Irregularity to have but bounded Desires for an infinite Good.

In effect, if Man ought not to love himself but in a limited Measure, the *Vacuum* of his Heart ought not to be infinite; and if the *Vacuum* of his Heart ought not to be infinite, it would follow that he should not have been made for the Possession of God, but for the Possessions of finite and bounded Objects.

Nevertheless Religion and Experience equally teaches us the contrary. Nothing is more lawful and more just than this insatiable Decree, which, after the possession of the Advantages of the World, makes us still seek the Sovereign Good; of all those who have sought it in the Objects of this Life, not one has found it.

Brutus, who made a particular profession of Wisdom, thought that he had not deceived himself in seeking for it in Virtue, but as he loved Virtue for it self, whereas it has nothing Amiable and Praise-worthy but by relation unto God; culpable of a fine and spiritual Idolatry he was no less grossly deceived, and was obli-

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ged to acknowledge his Error in dying, then when he cried out, *O Virtue! I know that thou art nothing but a miserable Fantasm, &c.*

This insatiable Desire then of the Heart of Man is not an Evil; it is necessary that it should be, that Men might thereby find themselves disposed to seek after God.

Then, that which in a Figurative and Metaphorical Idea we call a Heart, which has an infinite Capacity, a *Vacuum* which cannot be filled by the Creatures, signifies in a proper and literal Idea, a Soul which naturally desires an infinite Good, and which desires it without Bounds, which cannot be contented but with obtaining it; if then it be necessary, that the *Vacuum* of our Heart should not be filled by the Creatures, it is necessary that we should desire infinitely; that is to say, that we should love our Selves without measure; for to love ones Self, is for to desire ones Happiness.

And certainly as one may without deceiving ones self say, That a Man loves not the Creature when he loves it without bounds, because then he puts the Creature upon the Throne of the Creator, which is the Idolatry of the Spirit, and is the most dangerous of all; so likewise may it be said, That he loves not God

as his Sovereign Good, then when he conceives not for him but moderate Desires; for then he makes God descend to the State of the Creatures by the Impiety of his Heart, which is not less Criminal than his Idolatry.

Whether it be that we look upon God as our Sovereign Good, or that we represent him as a Being infinitely perfect, always it is certain, that the Ties which we have for him ought not to be limited; and it is, to the end that Man might be capable in some sort of the possession of this infinite Good, that the Creator has put a kind of Infinity in his Knowledge, and in his Affections.

I know very well that our Nature being limited, it is not capable (to speak exactly) of forming infinite Desires with vehemence; but if these Desires be not infinite in this sense, they are in another; for it is certain, that our Soul desires according to all the extent of its Forces, that if the number of Spirits necessary to the Organ could increase to infinity, the vehemency of its Desires would likewise increase to Infinity; and that, in fine, if Infinity be not in the Act, it is in the disposition of the Heart naturally insatiable.

I grant, that if we love our Selves by Reason, we might conceive, that the love
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of our Selves should be in a limited measure in our Heart ; for we do not find an Infinity of Reasons in our Minds for to love our Selves : But the Author of Nature, whose Wisdom has found, that he should not send away Man to take care of his Preservation until that he was a Philosopher , would that we should love our Selves by sentient ; which is so true, that it is not even conceivable that we can feel any Pleasure and any Joy without necessarily loving this Self, which is the Subject ; so that as there is an infinite variety and infinity of different Degrees in the Joys which we may taste, there is no measure in the desire of Happiness in the which this Joy essentially enters, nor by consequence in the love of our Selves, who are the Principle of this Desire.

I agree likewise, that if Man had been made for to be a Rival of the Divinity, he should not love himself without measure, for then the love of himself would enter in concurrence with the Divine Love ; but Man loves not himself naturally with so much vehemence, but for to be able to love God.

The Measure without measure of the love of himself, and the Desires which are as infinite, are the only Ties which bind him unto God, because (as I have already said)

said) moderate Desires cannot bind the Heart of Man but with the Creatures; and that it is not God that they love, but a Fantasm which they frame to themselves in the Place of God, when they love him indifferently.

Likewise it is a very great mistake for to oppose the Love of our Selves to the Divine Love, when it is well regulated. For what is this loving ones Self as one ought? It is to love God. And what is this to love God? It is to love ones Self as one ought. The Love of God is the good sense of the Love of our Selves, it is the Spirit and the Perfection. When the Love of our Selves turns towards other Objects, it deserves not the Name of Love, it is more dangerous than the most cruel Hatred; but when the Love of our Selves turns towards God, it confounds it self with the Divine Love.

And certainly nothing is so easie as to demonstrate invincibly that which our Searches have bought us in this regard: For to take, for Example, the Blessed, who without doubt love not Themselves too much nor too little, because they are in a State of Perfection; I demand, If they can love God without Bounds? Without feeling the Joy of his Possession? And I ask afterwards, If they can feel Joy, with-

out loving themselves proportionably to the Sentiments that they have thereof?

Let us not then stop at these vain and contradictory Questions. The Saints, Do they love God more than themselves? I had as live you should ask me, If they love Themselves more than they love Themselves? For these two Expressions have at bottom the same Sense; because we have made appear, that to love God, is to love with good Sense; and that not to love God, it is in some manner to hate ones Self.

For to shew that all this is but a Play of Words, it must be supposed, that there are two sorts of Love which one may have of God, a Love of Interest, and a Love of pure Amity, as the *Theologians* call it. I grant, that the latter has nothing to do to mix with the Love of our Selves, as they commonly hold; but I demand, Of which of these two Loves do you speak, when you ask me, if the Love which we have for our Selves be as great, as that which we ought to have for God? If you understand by this latter the Love of pure Amity, which has for its Object the known Perfection, and nothing else, I answer, That that Love cannot compare with the Love of our Selves, which is of another Nature, because (as I have already

ready said) we love not our Selves by Reason, but by Sentiment; and that the Corporal or Spiritual Pleasure naturally interestes us to the Love of our Selves, before even that we are capable of Reflexion.

That if by the Love which we ought to have for God, you understand the Love of Interest, which ties it self unto it as our Sovereign Good, you perceive not that you oppose a Thing against it self, because that to love ones Self, and to love ones Sovereign Good, confounds themselves together; that there are not there two Loves, but one only Love considered in two manners, to wit, by relation unto its Principle, and unto its Object.

It appears then, that the Evil is not in that we love our Selves too much, because we may love our Selves as much as we please, whilst we shall love our selves by relation to the Sovereign Good; but that the Irregularity consists in that, that we love our selves ill, that is to say, by relation unto false Objects.

The Love of our Selves is innocent in it self; it is Corrupted when it turns it self towards the Creatures, and Holy when it turns it self towards God. Following this Prospect, we may distinguish three Hearts in Man; the Heart of the Man,

Man, the Heart of the Sinner, and the Heart of the Faithful. The Heart of the Man is the Soul, in as much as it naturally loves; the Heart of the Sinner is the Soul, in as much as it loves the World; and the Heart of the Faithful is the Soul, in as much as it loves God. The Natural Heart enters Essential into the two others; and the Natural Love of our selves, which is the Principle of all our Affections, is the *Mobile*, which puts in motion Grace or Corruption, and which receives the Love of God, or the Love of the World; the Heart of the Man loves; the Heart of the Worldly Man loves Vanity; the Heart of the Faithful loves the Infinite and Eternal Good: The first is the Heart of Man, the second is the Heart of Man that perishes, and the third is the Heart of the Immortal Man.

C H A P. VII.

Wherein is shewn, That the Love of our Selves lights all our other Affections, and is the general Principle of our Movements.

I Have said, That the Love of our Selves is the Principle of all our Natural Affections; for if we desire, if we fear, if we hope, it is always for the Love of our Selves.

I grant, that the Affection which we have for others, sometimes makes our Desires spring, our Fears, and our Hopes: But what is the Principle of that Affection, unless it be the Love of our Selves? Consider well all the Springs of our Friendships, and you will find that they are all reduced to Interest, Acknowledgment and Proximity, Sympathy, and a delicate Accord, which Virtue hath with the Love of our Selves; which makes us believe, that we love it for the Love of it self, although we love it in effect for the Love of Us; all which is reduced to the Love of our Selves.

Proximity draws from thence all the Force which it has for to light our Affections; we love our Children, because they are our Children; if they were the Children of another, they would be indifferent to us: It is not Them then that we love, but the Proximity that binds us with them. It is true, that the Children love not their Fathers so much as the Fathers love their Children, although these two Affections appear to be grounded upon the same Reason of Proximity: But this Difference comes from another Cause; the Children see themselves dying in the Person of their Fathers, and the Fathers on the contrary see themselves reviving in the Person of their Children; then Nature inspires in us the Love of Life, and the Hate of Death; otherways the Fathers see in their Children their other Selves submitted and dependant; they felicitate themselves, in having brought them into the World; they consider them with Pleasure, because they consider them as their own Work; they are rejoiced in having Sacred and Inviolable Rights over them; there is their Magistracy, their Royalty, their Empire: But the same Pride which makes the Fathers love the Superiority, make Children hate the Dependance; nothing overwhelms us so much as a Benefit

when it is too great, because that it subjects us too much.

We look upon it as a delicate Chain, but strong, which binds our Heart, and which constrains our Liberty; it is the Mystery hid in the known Maxim, *The Blood never remounts*; to the rest as there is Proximity of Blood, Proximity of Profession, Proximity of Religion, Proximity of Country, &c. It is certain likewise, that the Affections diversify themselves in this regard in an infinite number of ways; but Proximity must not be opposed by Interest, for then certainly the latter will carry it; Interest goes directly to us, Proximity goes but by Reflexion; that makes that Interest always acts with more force than Proximity; but in that, as in all other Things, the particular Circumstances change very much the general Proposition.

One must impute almost unto the same Spring that which is ordinarily seen, that there is no Hatred more violent, than that which is kindled between Persons, who have loved each other extreamly; it is because these Persons did find Utility or Pleasure in loving each other; that interested Self-love. When then they come to change Sentiment, the Motives of Love joyn themselves to the Motives of Hatred;

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they rise, and by an Idea of Hurt which they do them, and by that of Pleasure and Friendship which they renounce and suffer by the Hatred which is kindled, and by the Affection which is extinguished; the which confirms excellently our System, and which shews us, that there is not an Affection in our Hearts which is kindled independently from the Love of our Selves.

This is a Thought in the which we confirm our Selves, in considering that not only Proximity is a Spring of Friendship, but more, that our Affections vary according to the Degree of Proximity which we have with the Persons who are the Object. The Quality of Man which we all bear, makes this general Benevolence which we call Humanity; *Homo sum, humani a me nihil alienum puto*: It is certain, that were there but two Persons in the World, they would love with Tenderness. But this general Proximity confounding it self with this infinite number of different Relations which we have one with another, it happens so, that this Natural Affection which it had caused to spring, loves it self in the croud of Passions, which so many other Objects produce in our Hearts.

We see not in our Neighbour the Quality of Man by the which he resembles us, whilst we see in him a Rival, an envious Man, a Man who is an Enemy to our Prosperity, as we are to his; a proud Man, who esteems none but himself; a Man, who by his good Qualities draws the Esteem and Attention of others, and throws us into Forgetfulness, and into Obscurity; or who by his Passion is always imployed in making Snares for us, or invading our Rights; but when Death hath robbed him of these odious Relations, then we find in him that general Proximity which made us love him; remembering our selves, that he was a Man only. then when he ceased to be, and would place him in the number of our Friends, when Death had cut him off from the Society of the Living.

The Proximity of a Nation ordinarily inspires in Men a Benevolence, which is not felt by them who dwell in their own Country, because that this Proximity weakens according to the number of those who leave it, but which becomes sensible, when two or three Persons originally of the same Country meet in a strange Climate; then the Love of our Selves, which has want of Props and Consolations, and which finds in the Person of them, that a like Interest, and a like Proximity, should put in the

Knowing ones Self.

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the same disposition, never fails of making a perpetual attention unto that Proximity, unless a stronger motive taken from his Interest, should hinder him.

The Proximity of Profession produces generally more aversion than friendship, by the jealousy which it inspires in Men, of one another: But that of Conditions, is generally accompanied with Benevolence. It is surprizing that the great should be without compassion for the Men of common Rank, it is because they see them at a distance, considering them by the Eyes of Self-love. They take them in no manner for their Neighbours. They are far from perceiving this Proximity, or this Neighborhood, they whose Mind and Heart is imployed with nothing but the distance which separates them from other men, who make this Object the delight of their Vanity.

Nevertheless, it must be granted, that the Proximity of Blood carries it ordinarily, before all the others, although it is commonly said, that *a good Friend is better than several Relations*, and if that be true in it selfe, it is nevertheless certain, that Men prefer their Relations before their Friends, and above all, in important occasions; which comes from that they consider their Relations as necessary Friends,

who cannot forbear being tyed to them, and their Friends as voluntary Relations, who affect them not, but as much as they please; then although free Friendship obliges more than necessary Friendship; it is certain that it is not so consider'd by the love of our selves, it may inspire us to more acknowledgment, but it cannot so much touch our Interest. The barbarous constancy which *Brutus* shewed in seeing his own Children dye, which he caused to be executed in his Presence, is not so disinterested as it appears; the most excellent of the *Latin* Poets discovers the motives in these terms.

Vincet amor Patria, laudumq; immensa cupido.

But he has not so disintangl'd all the Reason of Interest, which make the apparent inhumanity of this *Roman*. *Brutus* was as other Men, he loved himself more than all things; his Children are culpable of a crime, which tended to destroy *Rome*; but a great deal more still to destroy *Brutus*: if the paternal Affection excuse the Faults, Self-love aggravates them when it is directly wounded; without doubt *Rome* had the Honour of that which *Brutus* did for the love of himself, that his Country accepted the Sacrifice which he offered to his

his Self-love ; and that he was cruel by Weakness rather than by Magnanimity.

Interest can do any thing upon the Soul, it seeks it in the object of all its endearments ; and as there are divers sorts of Interest, one may distinguish likewise divers sorts of affecting, which Interest brings forth amongst Men. An Interest of Voluptuousness, produces gallant Friendship ; An Interest of Ambition, produces politick Friendship ; An Interest of Pride, produces illustrious Friendship ; An Interest of Avarice, produces profitable Friendship : Generally speaking, we love People but as much as they are agreeable or profitable to us. That if it should happen that all these different Interests united, for to form the Sentiments which we have for a Person, nothing would be comparable to that endearment which we should have for him. The Vulgar who declaim against interested Friendship, know not what they say, they deceive themselves in that they know, not generally speaking but one sort of interested Friendship, which is that of Avarice, whereas there are as many sorts of interested Affections, as there are of objects of Cupidity. On the other hand, they deny that they love Men for Interest, when they love them more strongly by that Principle than all others ; not compre-

comprehending, that loving for Interest, is for to love directly ones self, whereas to love them by other Principles, is to love ones self out of the way, and by reflexion; they perceive not that we take ill interested Friendship, when it is in the Hearts of others; but not when it is in our Hearts. In fine, they imagine that it is criminal to be interested; not considering, that it is the disinterestedness, and not the Interest that destroys us. If Man should offer us Riches great enough for to satisfy our Souls, we should do well to love him with a love of Interest, and no body ought to take it ill, that we should prefer the motives of that Interest unto those of Proximity, and of all other things. Gratitude it self so esteem'd in the World, and so recommended in Morality; and Religion is not more exempt from this commerce of the Love of our selves, for what difference is there at the bottom, between Interest and Gratitude; it is that the first has for its Object, a Good to come, whereas the latter has for its Object a Good that is past. Gratitude is but a delicate return of the love of our selves, which finds its self obliged; it is in some sort an elevation of Interest; we love not our Benefactor, because he is lovely. Gratitude, at least alone, goes

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not so far, we love him, because he hath loved us.

If you require that we should explain our selves more particularly in the comparison which may be made of Gratitude, and Interest, in that regard, we will say, that the Affection which Gratitude produces, is more noble, and that which Interest produces, is more strong; the First tends towards the part which is lost; whereas, Interest has for its Object that which is to come, which it will make profit of. Gratitude loves, even without hopes; but Interest hopes, and expects. Gratitude loves the Good for the love of the Intention; but Interest loves the Intention for the love of the Good. In fine, the Ideas of what's past, which are those of Gratitude, are ranged ordinarily amongst worn-out Ideas, abstracted, and which draw but weak Attention from our Souls; whereas the Ideas of the present, which are those of Interest, are the most lively Ideas, and which interests us most particularly. It is certain likewise, that there is by this Reason, some sort of opposition between the one and the other, that which makes that, as all Men are naturally interested, they are likewise naturally ungrateful. The measure of Interest, makes the measure of Ingratitude; because, that the more the Soul

Soul applies it self to the present Ideas, the more it loses of the tie and application which it ought to have for what is past: and in that regard it must be said of Gratitude, what was said of dis-interestment, that is, that it consists very often outwardly; and that rarely it springs in the Heart of Man, unless Interest it self gives it Birth, or make us not seek appearances, which happens sometimes.

C H A P. V I I I.

Wherein is continued to be shewn, that the Love of our selves, gives Birth to all our Movements.

THE lively and real Sentiment of a Good, which is granted us in the moment which we acquire it, never fails to produce a sort of acknowledgment in our Heart, which wears away, by little and little, with the remembrance of the Favour which we have received, because that the Heart has some repugnance to think often of things which puts us in a dependency; it is not so with the love of Favours we have done unto others, as it gives us some right over their Zeal, their Amity, and

and their Acknowledgment, that it subjects others to us; in a word, we think thereof with pleasure, which makes us a great deal more bent to love them who are debtors to us, than those to whom we are so our selves. Those who likewise find the means of insinuating themselves into the favour of Great Men, in obliging them, deceive themselves often enough in the thoughts which they have thereon; for it is certain, that the way to be beloved, is not for to act so, that they should have an obligation to you; but for to act so, that you should have one for them: Their Pride, which increases by the complaisance which other Men have for their Grandeur, applauds it self for having done them good; it thinks with pleasure, upon the obligations which you have for it, and disposes thereby the Heart to love you: but it is dangerous to render too great services, when one has no other design, but to insinuate ones self into the good Graces of those we would oblige. I tremble, for the great Service, said a Courtier to an Illustrious Man, to whom it was told, that he would never forget the obligation which he had for him. It often happens, that great Obligations hold the place of great Offences, and at least that always happens, or then when they cannot,

not, or then when they will not acknowledge them.

*Te le diray je Araspe ? il m'a trop bien servi
Augmentant mon pouvoir, il me la tout ravi.*

Shall I tell the Arasp ? He is kind to excess,
In augmenting my Power, he still makes it less.

But altho the Heart hath its reasons for to forget the Favours which it hath received, it has often others, for to make appear that it remembers. Gratitude is a Virtue very much esteem'd. The appearances are fine, and attract the Consideration ; and a Heart accustomed to traffick in appearances of Virtue, to make a commerce of Vain Glory, at the expence of Sincerity, in seeking, not that which is estimable in it self, but that which Men ordinarily esteem, takes care not to fail of affecting acknowledgment, when it can surprize the esteem of Men by that means. On the other side, Acknowledgments serve admirably to the ends of Interest, because it draws new Favours ; there is a pleasure, say they, in obliging that Man, he is sensible of the good one does him ; besides that, by acknowledgment, we place our selves in some sort above the Favour which we have received, when it is ready, active, and that it loves to make it self highly known ;

known; and it is a fine and delicate policy of a Self-Love enlightned, to shun the suspicion of Ingratitude, because that this Vice denotes Baseness; and that it is like a homage forced, which we make unto our Benefactor: Ingratitude, which hath trouble to think of it, confessing in spite of it self, that we are in its dependance, and that we owe it more than we are willing to owe it: It is again, a Sentiment, natural enough to Man, to shew that he merits the Favour that has been done him, by his deportment to his Benefactor. In fine, one is easie to be delivered of the remorse which Ingratitude breeds in our Heart, Remorse, greater, and more natural, than that which we have, for having failed of Justice; for let it be more against Reason not to be Just, as it is against Reason not to be Grateful; it is true, nevertheless, that it is more against the love of our selves, not to be Grateful, than not to be Just; and the reason is, without doubt, greater when it springs, not only from Reason, but likewise from the love of our selves, which hath been wounded.

Sympathy, which is the Fourth Spring which we have markt of our Affections, is of two Orders; there is one Sympathy of the Body, and another Sympathy of
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the Soul ; we must look for the cause of the First in the Constitution, and that of the Second, amongst the secret Springs, which actuate our Heart. It is likewise certain, that that which we believe to be a Sympathy of Constitution, hath sometimes its spring in the hidden Principles of our Heart ; Why, think you, that I hate a Man at the first sight, although he be unknown to me ? it is because he has some lines of a Man who has offended me, that those Lines strike my Soul, and awaken an Idea of hatred, without my making reflexion thereon ? Why, on the contrary, Do I love a Person unknown to me, so soon as I see him, without informing my self, if he have Merit, or if he have not ; it is because he hath either a conformity with me, or with my Children, or with my Friends, or, in a word, with some person whom I have loved, and that without my reflecting ; this conformity awakes in my Heart an affection that was hidden there ; you see then what part the love of our selves has in their mysterious and hidden inclinations, which one of our Poets describes in this manner.

*Il est de nœuds secrets, il est des Sympaties,
Dont par le doux accord, les ames assorties, &c.*

It is the secret knot of Sympathy,
That binds our Souls in friendly harmony.

But if after having spoken of corporal Sympathies, we should enter into the description of the Spiritual Sympathies, we shall know, that to love People by Sympathy, is but properly to cherish the resemblance which they have with us; it is for to have the pleasure of loving our selves in their Persons; it is a charm to our Hearts, to be able to speak good of our Selves, without wounding of Modesty; it is an advantage which we obtained, when we appear to esteem these People so much whom we lov'd, principally, because they resemble us; we love not only those unto whom Nature hath given conformity with us, but more, those who resemble us by Art, and who endeavour to imitate us. *Favorinus* imitates *Cato*, without *Cato's* being angry, as Wise, and as austere as he is; and it may be, the Man in the World, the most celebrated for stiffness, and in complaisance is weak enough, not to hate that misguided manner, of flattering his Self-love and caressing it. It is not, but that it may happen, that they

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may hate those who imitate them ill; no body would be ridiculous; they had rather be hateful; so that they never wish well to the Copies, which ridicule the Original.

That if it be askt here, why a brave Man does not always love a brave Man, and whence it comes, that a knowing Man renders not Justice always to another knowing Man; the answer is easie. It is, That a Reason of Conformity does not hold against a Reason of Jealousie, and Interest, and that the Rivals hate each other proportionably, as they find good qualities. The Heart, as we have already said, weighs the Utility, not the Light, and it is not reason, but love of our selves, which determines us in our Affections. We must not except out of this Rule, the love which we have for a Man of Virtue, of whom one may say, that those who do not resemble him nevertheless love him; for Vice renders in this respect forced homages to Virtue. They esteem it. They respect it.

Qui pectore magno

*Spem, metumque domas, vitio sublimior omni
Exemptus fati, indignantemque refellis
Fortunam, dubio quem non in turbine rerum
Deprehendet suprema dies, sed abire paratum
At plenum vita, &c.*

Tu cujus placido posuere in pectore sedem

Blandus honos, hilarisq; tamen cum pondere virtus,

Stat. Cui nec pigra quies, nec iniqua potentia, nec spes

lib. 3. Improbæ; sed medius per honesta & dulcia limes,

Sylv. Incorrupte fidem, nullosq; experte tumultus

Et secrete palàm qui digeris ordine vitam;

Idem auri facilis contemptor & optimus idem

Condere divitias, opibusq; immittere lucem.

Hæc longum florens animi, morumq; juventa

Illicos æquare senes & vincere præsta.

Let Men examine themselves by this Picture, I am sure they cannot forbear loving and esteeming the Original; and upon what Principles of Self-love can that Affection be grounded, which Men naturally have for those whom they care not to resemble?

I am sure in the first place, that there are very few persons who have renounced Virtue for ever; and who do not imagine to themselves, that if they are not virtuous at one time, that they may become so at another. I add, that Virtue is essentially amiable unto the love of our selves, as Vice is essentially hateful to it; The reason is, That Vice is a Sacrifice which

we make of others to our selves, and Virtue a Sacrifice which we make of some pleasure, or of some advantage which flatters us, or others. On the other hand, it is good to remark, that the Objects which act upon our Soul, have two sorts of agreement with the Love of our selves, particular agreement, which do interest it, and lively affect it; such is the agreement of Interest, or of reciprocal Amity; for as this reason of loving regards us, and regards none but us, that it is I that find the advantage in loving this Man, that it is I that love him, and not another; no one must wonder if this particular agreement obliges me to have a particular tie to him: but there are besides that, general agreements, which an Object may have with our Heart, which happens, either when it doth us good, because it doth to the society of which we make part, or then when we feel our selves obliged by the general bent which a Man shews to do good, because, that it is not impossible but that we may be the Object; or then when being accustomed to love a certain beneficence, which is that which doth us good in particular; we come likewise to love beneficence in general, and all those unto whom we apply the Idea: We must only remark, that as the particular agree-

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ments do produce lively and strong Affections, the general Agreements, as not interressing our Souls, but afar off produce but lukewarm and languishing Friendships, which hold a great deal more of the purity of Esteem, than of the ardour of Affection. All the Virtues favour the love of our selves, at least in this general manner. The finest Pictures that we can make of Virtue, are taken from the secret agreements which it hath with us: See, for example, these fine expressions in the Painter of Virtue, which we have here set down.

*Cui nec pigra quies, nec iniqua potentia,
Nec spes improba* —————

These lines of Virtue are amiable, because they flatter the love of our selves. Behold here, what rather brings forth our Esteem, than our Love, because they are more disinterested.

————— *Qui pectore magno,
Spem metumq; domas, vitio sublimior omni.*

Virtue, when it hath not that delicate agreement with the love of our selves, is estimable: but we make it more amiable, when we represent it, as interressing our Heart.

How should we not love clemency? it is always ready to pardon us our faults. Liberality strips it self to do us good, Humility disputes nothing with us, it gives way to our pretensions; Temperance respects our Honour, and would not rob us of our pleasures; Justice defends our Rights, and gives us that, which appertains to us; Courage defends us; Prudence guides us; Moderation spares us; Charity does us good, &c.

But if these Virtues do good, it is not to me that they do it. I grant it; but if you were in other circumstances, they would do it to you: but they do suppose a disposition of doing you good, if that should happen. Have you never found it thus, that although you have expected neither assistance nor protection from a rich person, you could not forbear having a secret Consideration for him? which springs not from your Judgment, which despises often the qualities of that Man; but from the love of your self, which makes you respect in him, even the single power of doing you good? That if the love of your self makes you consider a Man, of whom you are assured you shall never receive good, only because you consider in him, the power he has to do it; is it to be wondred at, that

that this same Principle should make you love a Man, who by his Virtue is disposed to do you good, although you know very well, that he has not the power?

Let us say then, that the Heart has its Abstractions as well as the Judgment, and as the latter knows how to define good in general, although it forms more lively in our imagination a particular good; the Heart loves likewise these general agreements, which the Objects have with it, although it be infinitely more toucht by particular agreements, and that it cannot but have a liking to a Man's being virtuous, because of those delicate Relations, which Virtue hath with the love of our selves. That which makes it plain, is, that you find that you love the Virtues more, proportionably as you find therein more relation and agreement with your Self: we love Clemency naturally more than Severity, Liberality more than œconomy, although all this be Virtue: that could not happen, unless it were from this, that our Affection is not entirely disinterested, and that we love in it, the secret Relations which it hath with us.

Besides, we must not except out of the number of those who so love the Virtues People that are vicious and irregular. On the contrary, it is certain, that for that

very reason that they are vicious, they ought to find Virtue the more amiable. Humility levels the way to our Pride, it is then beloved of a proud Man. Liberality gives, then it cannot displease an interested Man. Temperance leaves you in possession of your pleasures, it cannot be disagreeable then to one who is voluptuous, who would have no Competitor or Rival. Would one have believed, that the Affection which the Men of the World seem to have for virtuous People, should have so bad a spring, and would they pardon me this Paradox, if I affirm that it happens often, that the Vices which are within us, cause the love which we have for the Virtues of others?

I go yet much farther, and I dare say, that the love of our Selves, has a great part in the most purified Sentiments which Morality and Religion gives us of God. They distinguish three sorts of Divine Love, a Love of Interest, a Love of Acknowledgment, and a Love of pure Amity: The Love of Interest is confounded with the Love of our Selves, according to the Rules which all the World has thereof; The Love of Acknowledgment has still the same spring as that of Interest, accordingly as we have mention'd before; The Love of pure Amity seems to spring inde-

independently from all Interest, and from all love of our Selves. Nevertheless, if you look upon it near, you will find, that there is in the bottom the same Principle as in the others, for First, it is remarkable, that the love of pure Amity doth not spring all of a suddain in a Man acquainted with Religion. The First Degree of our Sanctification, is to disengage ones self from the World. The Second is, to love God with a love of Interest, in giving unto him all our endearments, because we consider him as the Sovereign good. The Third is, to have for his Benefits the acknowledgment which is due to them; and the last, in fine, is to love his Perfections. It is certain, that the First of these Sentiments dispose to the Second; the Second to the Third; the Third to the Fourth. One can hardly consider as one ought, the horrid misery which there is in abandoning God, without desiring his Communion, by the motives taken from our own Interest: A Man cannot love God as the principle of his Joy, and of his Felicity, without being sensible of acknowledgment for the Good which he has received from him. It is natural, and as it were necessary, that he that loves God as his Sovereign Good, and as his Great and Eternal Benefactor, should apply

apply himself with pleasure, to consider his adorable perfections, that this Meditation should afford him Joy ; and that thereby he should come for to love God in respect of his Virtues. Then, as all that which disposes unto this last movement, which is the most Noble of all , is taken from the love of our Selves ; it follows, that the pure Amity, of which God himself is the object, springs not altogether independently of this latter. On the other hand, experience informs us, that amongst the Virtues of God, we love particularly those which have the most agreement with us ; we love his Clemency more than his Justice ; his Bounty than his Jealousie ; his Beneficence than his Imensity ; Whence comes this ? unless it be that this pure Amity, which seems to have for its Objects, but the perfections of God, draws its principal force from the relations which those perfections have with us.

If there were a pure Amity in our Heart, in respect of God, which were entirely exempt from the commerce of the love of our selves ; this pure Amity would spring necessarily from the known Perfection, and would not rise from our other Affections. As it should not be the love of our Selves which should make it spring,

it should not be the Love of our Selves which should make it die.

Nevertheless the Devil knows the Perfections of God without loving him, Men know the Virtues of God before their Conversion; and no one dare say in this state, that he has this Affection for him, which is called Pure Amity: It follows then, that there must be something else beside the known Perfection for to produce this Love; that if there were required any thing else than Light, there must be then some Affection of our Heart, because that in our Souls there is nothing but Affections and Knowledges.

They will say, perhaps, that to the end a Soul may be capable of conceiving this Love of pure Amity, it need not be that Self-love should produce it, but that Self-love should not oppose it; but if pure Amity do spring from the known Perfection, and if there want nothing else absolutely but that to produce it, the opposition of the Love of our Selves is useless, as the Love of our Selves cannot hinder God from having Perfections, and those Perfections from being known to our Soul, it can likewise do nothing for to hinder the Birth of that pure Affection.

Whilst we look upon God as our Judge, and as a terrible Judge, who expects us
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with Thunder in his hand, we can admire his infinite Perfections, but we cannot conceive an Affection for them. It is very certain, that if we could refuse God this Admiration, we should take care not to give it him; for in this State wherein we look upon him as our Enemy, we give him but that which we cannot refuse him. And whence comes this necessity of admiring God? It is that this Admiration springs only from the known Perfection. If then you conceive that pure Amity has precisely the same Spring as Admiration; that is to say, that it is the known Perfection, and nothing but that which produces it; it follows that, as Admiration, pure Amity will spring in our Soul, without the Love of our Selves being able to hinder it.

It would serve for nothing to answer at random, that it is the Corruption of our Heart which makes us not capable of loving God, purely for the Love of Himself, when we suppose that he loves not us; it is to throw ones Self into Generalities for to avoid distinct Ideas of Things; for as Corruption hinders not the Admiration of our Soul, it being certain that the Devils, who are more wicked than we, admire God still, though they know themselves the Objects of his Hate;

Hate; this Corruption ought not to hinder the pure Amity, if, as the Admiration, the pure Amity springs from the known Perfection.

Nothing more confirms this Truth, than to see of what use Faith is in Religion, whilst Men live in Ignorance, which makes them imagine, that God looks upon them indifferently, and that he cares not for them; they seem likewise to have but indifferent Sentiments for the Divinity, such were the Philosophers of *Paganism*; whilst Men did believe themselves the Object of the Hatred of God, they hated horribly the Divinity: The *Romans*, who had already lighted the Fire of their Sacrifices for to render Thanks unto their Gods upon the false News of the recovery of *Germanicus*, run with fury into their Temples; so soon as they have the too true News of his Death, they drag their Idols in the Dirt, they cast them into *Tiber*, and signalize their Mourning by their Impiety. All Men seem to be of a disposition; that which the *Romans* were outwardly, and the Violence which these committed upon their Idols, is an Expression of that which Man would exercise against God, then when he thinks him his Enemy. When the Gospel sounded in the World for the Consolation thereof, through which do
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shine the Testimonies of the Love which God has for Human Kind, then likewise was seen the ardent Love which Men have for God sparkling in all places; the Faith which perswades the Hearts of this immense Charity of God, is for that reason look'd upon as the Key of our Heart, and the first Degree of our Sanctification; it is unto that which the Scripture attributes our Salvation, because we need only be perswaded by Faith of the Love which God has for us, for to feel ones self disposed to love God.

Besides, one may say, that as our Affections essentially rise from the Love of our Selves; our Hatred depends likewise thereon. We hate others by Interest, when they are our Competitors in the search after the Goods of this World. We hate the Intemperate, who disputes with us our Pleasures; the Ambitious, who would get before us in the way of Advancement; the Proud, who despises us, and tramples us under his Feet; the Covetous, who locks up the Riches which might come to our hands; the Unjust, who oppresses us. We do not only hate those who thus actually wrong us, but likewise those who have an inclination thereunto, although the want of Occasion, or other Reasons, may hinder them from exercising it; we hate even
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the Power that they have of doing us any. This is that which makes Power and Authority generally attract Sentiments of Aversion; and as there are very few People who do not meet on their way, either those who prejudice them in effect, or those who have the design to do it, or others, who would do it if they were able, or that it might be for their Profit; it must be granted, that there enters perpetually secret Motives of Envy into our Hearts, and that nothing is more dangerous, than the Temptations unto which we are exposed in this respect. So likewise may it be said, that we are very often Enemies one of another, without knowing any thing thereof. We hate sometimes, and love one and the same Person, because that the Love of our Selves considers him in different respects. It happens likewise, that we hate those of whom we think our selves the best beloved, and sometimes those whom we should have all the reason in the World for to love. That which makes this appear, is, that there is always in the Disgraces which befalls them, something which does not displease us. This unjust and unnatural Sentiment which we hide from our Selves by Pride, comes from these two Principles; from that we are not the Object of
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this Disgrace, a Reflexion which the Love of our Selves makes in an instant; and because that we see thereby a Man abased, who being a Man, cannot fail of being our Rival, and our Competitor, in some respect or other; a Sentiment which changes it self into Compassion, then when Death or some Disgrace without return excludes this Man for ever the Rank of those, who pretend to rival us in our Indearments

As to the rest, Hatred is a turbulent Passion, which agitates the Soul violently, and all whose Effects are so sensible, that that there is not a more faithful Looking-glass than it, for to know the degree of Vehemence which is in our Affections. Would you know how much you love Vain-Glory, (for it may be your Heart deceives you in that respect) you need only consider the violence of the Hatred that you have conceived for a Man, who has offended you in your Honour; therein is the Degree, and the Measure. You shall never find any thing so faithful as this Looking-glass, for to discover the bottom of your Heart.

We hate by Interest, Persons, Things, and Words; if we tremble with Horror and Fear, in seeing an Abyss under our Feet, it is the Image of our Loss which shews it self,

self, which causes this Apprehension; and Reason is too weak for to correct a Fright, which a too lively Idea of our Destruction forms in us.

There are many People who cannot see Human Blood spilt without swooning; that is rather a Weakness of Constitution, than a Weakness of Heart. Every thing that shews them the Ruines of Human Nature, threatens their Self-love; and it is that in bloodying their Imagination, makes Death enter lively in their Soul, and admits it by Sentiment there, where they refused to receive it by Reflexion.

C H A P. IX.

Wherein are considered, the most general Inclinations of the Love of our Selves, and first of the desire of Happiness.

THE first inclination of this Love of our Selves, is the desiring to be happy. I do not know likewise, whether those two Expressions don't signifie at the bottom the same thing under two Ideas; for what is it to love ones Self, if it be not to wish to be happy? And what is it to wish to be happy, if it be not to love ones

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ones Self? In truth, a Man must love very much to subtilize Things for to find any difference therein. As then the desire of Man to be happy cannot be too great, and that it has always been imputed as a Crime to Man to seek a false Felicity, and not for to love with too much Ardour the true Happiness; it follows, that we are to blame in loving our Selves ill, and not in loving our Selves with excess.

Men, whatever they say, agree in the Idea, in the Desire, and in the Sentiment of Felicity, when they consider it in general.

The diversity of Sentiments of Philosophers upon the Nature of Happiness, is not at the bottom so great as it at first appeared; their Opinion is reduced to that of *Epicurus*, who made Felicity essentially consist in Pleasure; which will appear very reasonable to you, provided you separate a pure, noble, delicate, durable, and secured Pleasure, from the Voluptuousness of Sense, which has Characters quite opposite to those; and that you distinguish between Happiness, and its Foundations which Men have been pleased to confound to have the Pleasure of contradiction. They place themselves under the favour of a Mistake. For when *Boetius* defines Felicity the Absence of all the Evils, and the Possession of all the Goods, he seems to be

possession of all the Goods, you must remark, that he defines intire and perfect Felicity, and not an incompleat and defectuous Happiness; and that besides, it is the defining of Felicity by its Foundations. The absence of Evils is necessary for to hinder us from being miserable; but it is not it which makes us happy; the Possession of Goods is the Foundation of our Happiness; but it is not the Happiness it self; for what would this be, if having them in our power we had not the sense thereof? The Fobl of *Athens*, who thought, that all the Ships that arrived in the Haven belonged unto him, tasted the Happiness of Riches without possessing them; and it may be they, to whom those Ships did really belong, possessed them without having Pleasure, poisoned by their insatiable Vitioufness, or afflicted by the Inquietudes which infallibly accompany the possession of Temporal Goods; it is not then to speak generally the Possession, but the Sentiment of the Goods which we possess, which makes our Happiness.

Thus when *Aristotle* makes Felicity to consist in the Knowledge and in the Love of the Sovereign Good, he apparently understood the defining of Happiness by its Foundations; otherwise he would have been grossly deceived, because if you sepa-

rate the pleasure from this knowledge, and this love, you will find that you must have something else to be happy; that on the contrary, if by Thought you joyn a lively and durable grief unto that knowledge and unto that love; you conceive that we shall not cease being miserable.

The Stoicks, who thought that Happiness consisted in the possession of Wisdom, have not been so senseless as to imagine that they should separate from the Idea of Happiness the satisfaction which that Wisdom inspired in them: their Joy came from the intoxication of their Soul, which applauded it self for a constancy, which had not.

Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,

Atq; metus omnes & inexorabile fatum

Subjecit pedibus, strepitumq; Acheruntis arae

All Men in general necessarily agree to this Principle, and I know not why the School should make them differ on this account. The Covetous Man feeds himself but with the hopes of enjoying his Riches: that is to say, to be sensible of the pleasure which there is in possessing them; it is true he doth not use them: but 'tis his pleasure to lock them up, this is to him the pleasure of them. The Ambitious seeks

Dignities, but for the pleasure of being elevated above others: and the revengeful would not avenge himself, if he did not hope for to find his satisfaction therein. This Maxim must not be opposed, which is certainly, the Morality, and the Religion of *Jesus Christ*; for *Jesus Christ* is not come for to annihilate Nature, but for to perfect it: He does not make us renounce the love of Pleasure, he proposes more pure Pleasures to us, more Noble, more Spiritual, more Assured, more Durable, than those which the world promised us: and when he defines Happiness; (*This is Life Eternal, to know the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent Jesus Christ.*) He defines Happiness by its springs; for otherwise he knows very well, that Happiness essentially consists in ineffable Joy and Pleasures; for it is a Feast, a new Wine, a river of Delights, a fountain of Peace and Joy, &c. Expressive of which under the Emblems of Temporal Pleasures, makes us comprehend the Eternal Pleasures of Paradise.

The Idea which Men have of Happiness, comes assuredly from the Sentiment which Men have of Pleasure; the vicious seek the Pleasures of Intemperance, those of Vain-glory, those of Revenge; and the virtuous Man on the

the contrary, seeks the pleasures of Virtue, as the pleasures of Moderation, those of Beneficence, those of Temperance, those of Conscience, and of Piety.

A Man who should pretend so to dry up Virtue, that he should have there in no sentiment of Joy and Pleasure, would certainly do nothing but discourage our Hearts; and Virtue would have our Esteem, without having our Affection.

I grant, that one and the same pleasure does not please all, some are for gross Pleasures, others for delicate Pleasures; some are for a lively Pleasure, others are for a durable Pleasure; Some for the pleasure of Sense, and others for the pleasures of the Mind; Some for the pleasure of Sentiment, and others for the pleasure of Reflexion: but all without exception are for pleasure.

Let us say likewise, that all Men agree in the general Desire, which they have of being happy; they may renounce all their Affections: but they will never renounce this Inclination, which is the spring of the others. It is Happiness which the Poor and the Rich aim at, the Young and the Old, the Covetous and the Liberal, the Temperate and the Voluptuous; and this Happiness is the pleasure which is in their Idea; pleasure which diversifies in an infinite

the number of ways ; causes likewise the prodigious variety of our Passions, and our Affections. The irregularity consists in this, That Men would be sensible of the Happiness before they acquire it ; they wait not for Reason, who should direct them to be happy ; they begin by *Will* to possess ; that is to say, that nothing contents but the pleasure which they actually feel.

*Non est, crede mihi, sapientis dicere vivam :
Sera nimis vita est crastina, vive hodie.*

Martial. lib 1. Epig.

It is not to be wondred at, that Men created in Paganism, should not have known any other good than the present ; and that they should have counsell'd Men to hasten to taste the pleasure which presents it self, for fear of loosing it, by dissolving it : but it is something astonishing, that those who know Eternity, should be capable of the same irregularity.

Pleasure for to compose our Happiness ought to have other Characters, it ought to be Spiritual ; a Man who tastes pleasure in the Body, can he be happy, if his soul be fill'd in the same moment with remorse, with fear, and with sadness ? In the second place, it ought to be durable: the

momentary pleasures are more proper to make us miserable, than to make us happy, because, that the sense thereof indures but a short time, and that it leaves us a durable regret.

And certainly durance is so essential to the Happiness of Man, that I dare say, that the felicity of Paradise it self would be but a small thing, if it should be possible that it should last but an instant, and that the felicity of the World should be something, if it were possible that it should endure always: For the First, as great as it is, would be all drunk up by the gastly Thought that we are going about to lose that which gives us an infinite Joy. The Second would be sustain'd by a hope which heaping an infinite number of Ages, would make us find in the durance of the Goods, that which they could not find in their Quality.

Mart. 10. lib. Epig.

*Res non parva labore, sed relictæ,
Non ingratus ager, focus perennis,
Lis nunquam, toga rara, mens quieta,
Vires ingenuæ, salubre corpus,
Prudens simplicitas, pares amici,
Convicius facilis, sine arte mensa,
Nox non ebria sed soluta curis,
Non tristis torus attamen pudicus,
Somnus qui faciat breves tenebras,*

Quas

*Quod sis, esse velis, nihilq; malis,
Summum nec metuas diem, nec opes.*

But although this definition of Felicity appear so reasonable, that it seems to be dictated by the mouth of Wisdom it self, nevertheless, there needs but an indifferent knowledge of the Heart of Man, and of the natural state of his condition, for to see that it sins in very many respects.

First, it is composed of Goods, which for the greatest part are not in our power, such are, (*res non parva labore, sed relictis; non ingratus ager, focus perennis, lis nunquam, vires ingenue, salubre corpus, somnus qui faciat breves umbras.*) for no body can give Good to himself, and make that Good come to him from Father to Son, nor make his Fields fertile, nor avoid having some difference with unjust Persons; and it depends not upon us to sleep well, nor to have a Body healthful and vigorous; and nevertheless, it seems that Nature it self instructs us, that it depends in some manner on us to render ourselves happy: for why should it engrave in the Soul of all Men the desire of Happiness, if it were not capable of arriving at the end? But in that Men deceive themselves, by not understanding a double Language which Nature speaks to them in that respect;

respect ; for on the one side, in making them see that they are deprived of so many Goods which they naturally desire, which are not in their power ; it tells them very clearly, that Happiness is not in themselves : And on the other side, in inspiring them with the desire of Happiness so naturally, that they never quit it, in whatsoever estate they find themselves, it teaches them that they may nevertheless obtain it. But for to come back to our Poet, I will add, that this description of Felicity, is not composed of Objects Noble enough. Certainly it wants but little of agreeing with Beasts, of whom may be said, without mistake, that their Goods are the Goods of Succession, and not of Riches, acquired by a great deal of pains ; that the Earth is very fruitful for them, that they want not Cloaths which are convenient for them, and made by the hand of Nature ; that Strength, Health and Sleep, doth not fail them, that their Simplicity is Prudent, and that more they appear not capable of Reflexions, they are seen very ready, and very wise in the sphere of Objects, which they ought to know for their Interest, that is to say, for their Propagation, or for their Conservation, that their Life is sweet and quiet, that they live without jangling and inquietude ; that their Pleasures

Measures are not mixt with Suspitions, and Jealousies, that Law-Suits never torment them; and that which is most considerable, that they are content with their State, and that they neither desire, nor fear Death. Beasts then enjoy, very near, the Felicity which they represent as the most perfect of all; and what then is it for us, so great a misery; to be born capable of Reason, that the Quality of reasonable, hinders us from pretending to that of Happy; that the degree of our Perfection should make the degree of our Misery, that the Beasts should be happy not to be Men, and that the Men should be miserable not to be Beasts? Certainly there is no likelihood it should be so; Nature is too wise in all other things, to be so little in this, and unless that Men will degrade themselves, and undertake to brand the excellency of their Nature, they must agree that there is a Sovereign Good, which may be found, and which deceives not our Desires: but which is not found in the objects of this Life, which always deceive our Desires.

We must add still, that the finest Lines of this Description, which the Poets make of the Felicity of Men, are contradictory. For if a Man be happy even to the point of being satisfied with his State

State, and not desire a better, how can he not bear Death, which is the fatal Term of that Felicity? And if that which he quits by his Death is so small a Thing, that he neither desires or fears to die, how is it that he can be satisfied with his Condition? That Man spoke very much at his ease. He seems to say nothing neither in these Verses:

*Quod sis esse velis, nihilque malis,
Summum nec metuas diem, nec optes.*

That is, the Philosopher's Stone in morality, which is a Man that is content with his Condition, and who fears not Death. Besides, that these Ideas destroy themselves, they annihilate the Nature of Man, who loves himself necessarily, and who loves himself without bounds, as we have already seen. He loves not Happiness with mediocrity, and by consequence he cannot be contented until he has obtained the infinite Good. He fears Misery most sovereignly, and by consequence he cannot cease fearing until he shall be assured of his Immortality.

It is certain besides, that one of the greatest Defects of the Felicity that Man seeks after, or of that Pleasure after which he runs with so much Ardour, is, that it is

is certain in its Foundations ; it depends on a thousand Causes which are not in your power to procure, or to take from it. What Reliance can you have upon the health of a Body, which every thing threatens with ruin ; and what tranquillity can you have in that regard, if its death is every where found, in the nourishments which makes it live, in the Air ; which it breaths ; in the breath of one sick which it beholdeth, in an Insect which pricks it, in an infinity of secret Causes , which we can neither prevent nor shun ? Who shall assure me of the possessions of my Riches ? Who shall be answerable to me for the Conservations of the Persons who are agreeable to me ? Who is it that shall cover me and mine, from the accidents so ordinary in Society ?

The Fourth fault of this Human Felicity, is , that not only it is corruptible, but likewise momentary ; it lasts not so long as our lives, it wants a great deal ; Sleep, during which we are without Sentiment, carries away a good part ; it doth not subsist so long a time as this halfe of our life, which we pass in waking and in reflexion ; for we are not always employed in tasting of Pleasure : I will say much more, it endures not so long as the presence of the Object, which gave it breath.

Pleasure

Pleasure endures not but in this passage, which lasts so little from Privation to Enjoyment. There is some joy in acquiring, but this Pleasure is lost, so soon as it is acquired. The greatest Goods in the World, when they have been possess'd two Days, do hardly affect us; it seems that Felicity in this regard, consists not but in the satisfaction of Desire, which neither renders you happy when it lives, or when it dies: But in the instant that it expires, Nature so wise in all things, would instruct us; that this Good ought not to be neglected, because that she has affixt Joy to the Acquisition; but it would instruct us, that this Good ought not to satisfy our Soul, because that these pleasures vanish, almost as soon as we begin to be sensible of them. The Fifth defect of the Felicity Men reach after, consists in this, that their Happiness is always mixt with misery; they have no Good which is not accompanied with Bitterness.

Impia sub dulci melle venena latent.

Ovid. lib. 7. metam.

I know not likewise how it happens, that the proportion of Goods, which are annex't to a condition, is the proportion of Evils which will follow it.

Ut rebus latis par sit mensura malorum.

Idem. Lib. 1. Eleg.

In fine, the last is, that this Felicity fills not our Soul; it answers not the Affection with which we have desired the Temporal Goods; So that finding an extream disproportion between the good which we have acquired, and the ardour with which we have desired it; we find our selves in some sort famisht in the middle of Plenty.

Although the Love of our Selves, loves not to consider all the things, which may shew it the vanity of its ties; it is certain, nevertheless that it interviews all the defaults in the Felicity which it pursues: it feels that the pleasure of Sence is rather the Felicity of Beasts than of Men; it agrees that Happiness to be solid must be durable, it does not deny that an assured Happiness is not preferable to a Felicity, which is uncertain in its foundation. It is sensible that to be happy, Man must be able to fix this transitory Pleasure, which is not found but in the instant of the Acquisition. It agrees that true Felicity ought to fill our Souls.

Right Reason requires, that it should seek other springs of Felicity; but present Pleasure

pleasure which interesteth it, and which seduceth the Understanding, and fixing it unto that which is agreeable, rather than that which is true, suffers it not to take this way; his own Illusions serve him here at their Table, they come and take the place of Qualities which the Object wants, not being able to make in the World a Felicity which might satisfy his Reason: Man makes himself in this respect a Reason which satisfies his pleasure. The Judgment pre-possess gives unto them false Goods, a character which they have not in themselves; and it is here above all, that we must admire the prodigious ascendant which the Heart has over the Judgment; for it is nothing to disguise the abstracted and speculative troubles: But to disguise the troubles of Sentiment and Experience: it is that which shews us better than all other things, the force of our corruption; and it is that we shall see, in unfolding the most hidden Mysteries of this Self Love.

C H A P. X.

Wherein are consider'd the Illusions which Self-Love frames, for to correct the defects which it finds in the Happiness it seeks after.

SELF-Love being sensible that the Worldly Felicity is too gross for to satisfy our Judgment, and in effect a Happiness which none but the Body feels, ought not to satisfy our Soul; it seeks for to Spiritualize the corporal Pleasures for to deceive us, in showing us, that they satisfy equally the Soul and the Body. Therefore Self-Love has affixt unto this gross and carnal Felicity the delicateness of Sentiment, the esteem of the Judgment, and sometimes the Duties themselves of Religion, in conceiving them Spiritual, Glorious and Sacred.

For the First, who would not be astonish'd to see the prodigious number of Thoughts, of Sentiments, of Fictions, of Writings, of Histories, which the voluptuousness of Sense has invented. Gather together all the Books which were ever

made upon Morality, which is the Science of Well-living, and compare them with those which have been made upon the pleasures of Intemperance, and the Actions which depend thereon. You will find that there is no comparison to be made between the one and the other. To consider these Actions under their natural form, they have a baseness which rebukes our Pride, which consists in the Abject and vile Conformity which they give us with other Animals. What must be done for to elevate them, and to render them worthy of Man? One must Spiritualize them, to make them an object for the nicety of the Judgment, to make them a matter of fine Sentiments, to invent thereupon the Plays of Imagination, to turn them agreeably by Eloquence and Poetry; and in fine to employ Eternally all the Faculties and all the Lights of the reasonable Soul, to make the pleasures agreeable unto a proud Soul, which a voluptuous Body has tasted. I speak here according to the prejudice of the Vulgar; for the Body in it self has no Sentiment. It is for that, that Self-Love has still fixt esteem to the most shameful abasements of Human Nature. Pride and Voluptuousness are two Passions which notwithstanding they come from the same Spring, which is Self-Love, nevertheless,

have

have something of opposition. Voluptuousness makes us descend, whereas Pride would elevate us. The First makes us bear the Image of Beasts, and the Second the Image of the Devil; so these two Passions oppose each other often in our Heart; but this combat cannot be agreeable to a Heart which would preserve the one and the other, and which is almost equally sensible of Pleasure and of Glory; it must make them agree, and for that it makes of two things one, either it transports the Voluptuousness into the Pride, or it transports the Pride into the Voluptuousness, if I may express my self in that manner. Renouncing the pleasure of Sense, it will seek a greater pleasure in acquiring Esteem; so that we find here voluptuousness indemnified; or taking the resolution to satisfy self by the pleasure of Sense, it affixes Esteem unto Voluptuousness; so that there we see Pride comforted for its losses.

If there was but one only Man of this disposition, he would not easily succeed in his design: but the misery is, Men are alike, and they understand one another; and as they have alike inclination, they agree without difficulty to consecrate it.

It is a Ragoo for Pleasure, which makes it a great deal more exquisite than Glory, that the irregular imagination of Men has fasten'd to it : but the reasoning is still much better, than when this pleasure is lookt on as a pleasure which Religion ordains. A debaucht Woman who could perswade in the time of Paganism, that she fulfill'd the inclination of a God, found the pleasures of Intemperance much more sensible ; and a Religious Man who diverts himself, or who avengeth himself under Sacred pretences, finds in the voluptuousness a Salt more pricking and more agreeable than Voluptuousness it self.

So one may distinguish Two Parts in the Human Felicity of which we speak, a gross and sensible part which is as the Body ; and a part more free and delicate, which we will call its Spirit. It is certain, that as all the Sentiments of Pleasure and Joy which we have in the World, increases the Body of this Felicity ; all the illusions which Self-Love frames upon this Subject, for to make it appear either Reasonable or Glorious, or Sacred ; all the false discourses of Men, who speak Eternally of the Objects of their Desires, all the bad Ideas of Education, which in this respect deceive us, after an infinite number of manners ; all the bad Lectures, all the

Studies

Studies which go out of the way of Piety, a thousand Prejudices, a thousand Maxims falsely establisht, serve for to augment it to the Judgment, and to make this vain Felicity enter into the highest part of our Soul by Esteem, as it had already enter'd into the lowest by Sentiment.

It is thus, that Self-Love takes its measures against the first Defect which it interviews in its pretended Felicity. But it is not in that alone that it finds its defect; it is still so mixt, that it renders us rather miserable than happy, and it is in this that Self-Love delights to delude itself. For apprehending that the strong attention which we make upon the defects of the Goods of the World, upon the Incommodities and Miseries which accompany them, may disabuse us in that respect, it turns away our Consideration from all that which is the most capable of making us sensible of this Misery, which accompanies the Goods of the World, the thing is little difficult; For how shall we place our selves above the proof of Sentiment? that that hinders us not from succeeding in the extream desire we have of deceiving our Selves agreeably.

For to comprehend that well, one must know, that at the present how sweet soever it may appear to us, and whatever inclinations we may have to sacrifice all for it, it appears nevertheless too short, and too much bounded to a Soul, which loves to extend and agrandize it self by imagination, it almost causes *the Past* and *to Come* to enter into the Idea of our condition; not *the Past* and *to Come*, such as they are in Truth; but *the Past* and *to Come*, such as our Soul would wish them. Our State appears to us then a mass of Goods, which follow us, and goes before us. By remembrance of the pleasures that we have had, we render the *Past present* to us, and by the Idea of the Goods which we hope to have in the World, we anticipate what's *To come*. If we should carry a right view upon all their differences of time, we should find in the *Past*, that which we find in the *Present*, that is to say, Goods mixt with a great deal of bitterness; for the Good which we have possessed, has not been more pure than that which we possess, and that which we shall possess, is not different from that which we have possess: But as the Soul loves not to think but on that which pleaseth it, it happens that it retains the Ideas of Good which it has possess, because these Ideas are agreeable, and that

that it loses the Idea's of Evil, which hath been mixt with that Good, because that those Idea's have something grievous, unless that the Evil Past be to us yet as a Good, because that we are deliver'd from it; it forms likewise an agreeable Idea in our Judgment, in regard of what's to come; we know it not but by Hope, then Hope has the Good for its Object, and not at all the Evil. The *Past* and to *Come*, one whereof is no more, and the other is not yet, holding a great space in our imagination, and presenting themselves always with that they have agreeable, and never with that which they have of grievous; one must not wonder, if a shining Idea of our Happiness form it self little by little, which is very difficult to be destroyed by the Sentiment of our Misery. Our past Joys subsist still. The applauses wherewith our Merit has been recompenc'd, appear to us really Present, because that Pride hath livelyly painted them in our imagination. And what would this be, if we could add such advantages as we have not yet, unto those we already possess; and if we should obtain the fortune of those who are the object of our Envy? So by a Second irregularity of our imagination, which hath the same spring as the first, we form to our selves an Idea of those

H 4

Goods,

Goods, which being in the power of another Man, are become the objects of our Desires, an agreeable and flattering Idea, because we see that which they have of glistering, and that we cannot see all the pains that accompany them. So that the Idea of our State, and the Idea of the State of other Men; the agreeable Images of what is past; a thousand hopes which have for their certain Object the Incertitudes of what is to come, striking our Minds incessantly; whereas the Evils which are to come, are not felt but from time to time; it is no wonder if the Soul grows intoxicated, and if a thousand experiences cannot bring it back from its illusions. This blindness goes so far as to dare sometimes to look upon this Felicity of Flesh and Blood, as having secured Foundations. We have a proof of this Truth in the Language of that Man, whom the Son of God represented, as feeding himself with the certain Ideas of a Happiness, which was suddainly to be ravish'd from him. (*My Soul, said he, eat and drink, make good cheer, we have goods beaped up for many years.*) Thus he spake when he heard a terrible voice which told him, (*Thou fool thy Soul shall be required of thee this night; and then the goods which thou hast beaped up, unto whom shall they belong?*)

But

But in fine, Man is not so blind, that he interviews not the end of this Felicity, wherewith he is as it were enchanted; he knows that the World shall not always make his Happiness, because that it is composed of corruptible Objects, and he is not ignorant, that he shall not be always in a condition of tasting the pleasures of the World, because he is not immortal. So that because of the defect of this perpetuity of Sentiment which he cannot obtain, he seeks to perpetuate his memory. Thus he saves what he can from the Shipwrack; but that which he saves is not worth the care that he takes. For what is the Glory of Man after his death? It is said an Antient, a good Wind after a Shipwrack; and certainly nothing is more vain than all the means which Self-love has invented for to perpetuate its Glory. The Urns, the Tombs, the Pyramids, the Mausoleums, the Theatres, the Temples, the Cities built to the memory of illustrious Men, Poetry and Eloquence, the Art of Painters and Gravers employed to preserve some Ideas of their Virtue, or some Lines of their Faces, cannot avoid the destiny of corruptible things; and as these things cannot perpetuate themselves, they are incapable of Eternizing those whom they have

have for thir Object: that would be to perpetuate the Shadows, and how should they perpetuate the Sentiment ?

Nos quoque flornimus, sed flos fuit ille caducus

I know not whether a Man should be more unreasonable, when by the efforts of his Desire he should doubt of his Mortality, than he is then, when by the seduction of his Heart he shall seek a vain immortality.

I know very well, that no body seriously denies but that he must Dye; but I know not likewise, whether any Man tells himself seriously that he shall dye: for thō these two terms have a too true Relation, no body will unite them; and if they look on them, it is certainly with an Eye which unties them one from another. We consider Death without considering our Selves, we consider our Selves without considering Death: but we love not to represent our Selves by the Idea of Death; and nothing in the World, let them believe what they please, is more rare or more grievous to our Hearts, than the joyning these two Ideas is in our imagination.

This is not all yet Self-love undertakes in some sort, to fix the pleasure which the acquisition of Temporal Goods gives us. It is with this design, that it seeks to en-

oy often the Good which it possesses, be
by Thought, in representing it the oft-
est and most lively that is possible, be
they the advantages which it hath acqui-
red thereby, be it in seeking new methods
of tasting the pleasure unto which it is ac-
customed. It was a very great extrava-
gancy of *Caligula*, to propose the making
of his Horse Consul, and causing him to
be brought before the Senate, clothed
with Consulary Ornaments, and the bun-
dles of Rods marching before him : but
this extravagance, which so much wounds
the Judgment, had its pleasures for a Heart,
which being accustomed unto Sovereign
Power, and hardly being longer sensible
of it, found the means to give it an Air
of novelty, by the irregularity of its re-
lish, and the fantasticalness of its humour.
Caligula in his Folly had the pleasure to
see therein, how much other men were
inferior to him. In fine, Self-love which
seems to be disabused from the excessive Idea
which it hath conceived of Temporal
things, then when it sees the void which
they leave in our Heart, frames to it self
an illusion still in this regard. For seeing
that it cannot be happy by this manner of
temporal Goods which it hath acquired,
it prepossesses it self with the Thought
that it shall find in the quantity the Hap-
piness

pineſs which it finds not in the quality of their advantages. Thus the rich Man, who ought to diſabuse himſelf from the vanity of Riches, by the experience which he makes of them, perſwades himſelf he ſhall be happy, when he ſhall be Richer than he is at preſent; and as the degrees of temporal Proſperity are not limited, it is not to be wondred at, in whatſoever State he ſhall find himſelf in, there be formed ſtill in him new Deſires.

And becauſe that our Soul interviews that the advantages of the World are leſs conſiderable by their being real, than by their being imaginary, it has that addreſſe to deceive it ſelf ſtill upon this ſubject; it ſeeks the eſteem of others, and to paſs for happy in the judgment of the multitude, for to make uſe afterwards of this eſteem for to deceive it ſelf, and to perſwade it ſelf of its own Happineſs, upon the Faith of them who know us not. It is an agreeable Object to a great Man, to ſee himſelf follow'd by a greedy and intereſſed croud of People, who ſhow enough by their preſſing the accompt they make of Grandeur, that perſwades him that he is not deceiv'd in the Thought that he had that he ſhould be happy, by that which ſhould elevate him above other Men; and it the interior experience which he makes
of

of his State, agree not with this Thought, he suspends these sad reflexions of his Mind; and he says to himself, that so many People who esteem him happy may deceive themselves, and he resolves to be satisfied with his condition, in despite of all the Sentiments, and all the experiences of his misery.

I know very well, nevertheless that it often happens, that Men repulsed by some danger, or present disgrace, which makes a lively and profound impression in their Hearts; are disgusted at their condition, and bear an envy unto that of other Men: but this disgust endures not long, it is dissipated with the Object it hath brought forth; and as the agreeable Ideas take place next after the sad Ideas which had struck our Souls, and had in a manner wounded them, in entering impetuously into our Judgment, then we see nothing but what's fine of our condition; and we reprehend our selves for our first designs. It is this which one of the most agreeable Wits of the Age of *Augustus* has express'd with a great deal of Livelyness and Grace in one of his Odes.

Qui

*Qui fit Mecenas, ut nemo quam sibi sortem,
 Sen ratio dederit, seu sors objecerit, illa
 Contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentes?
 O fortunati mercatores, gravis annis
 Miles ait, multo jam fractus membra labore.
 Contra mercator, navem jaclantibus austris:
 Militia est potior: quid enim? concurritur: hora
 Momento cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta.
 Agricola laudat juris, legumq; peritus
 Sub galli cantu Consultor ubi ostia pulsat.
 Ille datis vadibus, qui rure extractus in urbem est
 Solos felices viventes clamat in urbe.*

And certainly it is no great wonder, that the conditions of others appear ordinarily more happy than our own unto our Self-love, because that we feel our own Ills, and feel not theirs; and that their Goods shew themselves to us without mixture, because that we see but the outside of their condition. But in fine, let it be the Idea of Temporal advantages we possess, or the image of Goods which others possess, which prepossesses us so advantageously in favour of the Goods of the World; it is certain that we have an excessive Idea of them; and it is that which Men look upon ordinarily as their Sovereign Good. For to that end, it is not necessary that our Judgment judge expressly

pressly and distinctly, that the World is the Sovereign Good ; nor that our Mouth pronounce these same words. Man is naturally too Glorious for to affect thinking, or saying absurdities that are too sensible, but he loves the World enough for to say it in his Heart, if he say it not with his Judgment.

But it will be good to continue the consideration of the most general inclinations of our Heart, which flow from the love which we have for our selves. For it will be easie to us to know their Streams, when we shall have well discovered their Springs.

C H A P. XI.

Wherein are considered the general Inclinations of the love of our Selves, and the desire of perfections.

THE Two general Goods which Man naturally wishes for, are Happiness and Perfection : but he wishes not for them, but with some subordination, and some dependance. For he wishes not for Happiness for Perfection : but he wishes for Perfection for Happiness.

Man

Man cannot be well satisfied whilst he conserves the Ideas of his defects. It is that which obliges him to disguise them to himself, as much as he can possible, and to rid himself of them, unless that in renouncing his defects, he should renounce some sort of Pleasure, in the which he makes his Happiness to consist.

It is true, that as the Judgment judges always in favour of the Affections of the Heart; it deceives us often in confounding Vices with Virtues, Defects with Perfections. In *Æthiopia* the handsomest People are the blackest; in *Europe*, and in the rest of the World they are the whitest; it is not, it may be, so easie as is imagin'd to decide, who are in the wrong. It is so of the qualities of the Soul. Vivacity, which makes a great part of the most shining Merit in certain Countries, passes in others for an essential defect.

And certainly, nothing is more difficult than to make this just discernment of Defects from the Perfections in the midst of these darkneses and prejudices which follow our corruption. It is not sufficient for that to consult the publick Opinion; for Men often agree to consecrate the weaknesses which are common to them, and when they agree in an affection, they generally judge it worthy of an esteem,

or at least of support. There are Countries, where Drunkenness passes for the Vice of a dishonest Man; and others, where it is lookt upon as a fault a-la-mode; and which does no essential harm.

There will be then no harm, if Men suspend their Judgments upon that which they call Vice and Virtue, Perfection and Imperfection, until they shall have time to consult the distinct prospects of their Judgments, or Religion, which is still a shorter way for to know their true Duties.

Now to help us to discern this, we must remark that there is this difference between God and the Creature, that there is none but God that possesses all the Perfections; so that it may be affirm'd, that he has all that which can be known as a Good, or which merits any esteem, that if he hath it not expressly, he hath it eminently, that is to say, that he has these Qualities, or Perfections yet greater, which answer to these Qualities. But for the Creature, it cannot pretend but to possess the Perfections which are due to its Species. It is not necessary that a Stag should have wings, it is enough that it has swiftness for its share. The Birds have nothing to do to swim, it is sufficient that they have wings to flye.

Then, in this Men fail doubly, in that they pretend to have the perfections, which are no ways due to their Species, and in that they renounce those which belong to them, and which matches their essential Perfections; for they give to their Body that which belongs not to it, and take from the Soul that which doth belong to it.

They will perpetuate and spread the first, they endeavour to prove it a Species of Eternity, of which it is not capable, and a Species of Grandeur, or if you please of Immensity, which cannot agree with it.

But Men fail more yet, in that they will not enter into themselves, nor consider that which they are naturally. As they imagine falsely, that the quality of Man contains but baseness and misery, they seek not the Perfections which are due unto this general Quality: but they aspire to get out of this common condition, by the help of strange Goods, and exterior Relations which distinguish them.

They seek no longer the Perfections due to Man: but the Perfections due to a Magistrate, to a Handicrafts-man, to a Learned Man, to a Citizen, to a Gentleman, to a great Lord; they make their Honour consist no longer in that which
might

might perfect human Nature, and enrich the Mind, that immortal Essence, the lively expression of the Divinity: but in that which may make us succeed in our profession, however low it be in it self, or make us fill worthily the place in society, wherein we find our selves by the circumstances of our Life.

From thence it follows, that Men consider not the qualities, and call them not Perfections or Defects, but according to the relation which they have with the state wherein they suppose themselves, and in the which Self-love and Pride fixes them for to make themselves esteemed. A Learned Man by profession, nettles not himself with Bravery. A brave Man troubles himself rarely with Learning. Tell the first that he wants Courage, he will but laugh. Make this reproach to the Second, you will fill him with fury: because that Learning is not due to a Man of War, nor Courage to a learned Man. This ought to be understood when Self love fixes one in the place of the Learned, and the other in that of Brave; for it happens often enough, that a Man affected by Pride, to appear that which they call (*Omnis homo,*) and then the Maxim changes with the supposition.

It cannot be said how many false prejudices arise from this Spring. Injustice, Debauchery, Rage finds thereby means to consecrate themselves. Ordinary Robbery unites not it self with Fortune, and the state of a particular Man, who sees himself hang'd, or broken upon the Wheel for having committed it; it is then a fault, and likewise a base and shameful fault; but the great Robberies, as the conquest of Towns and Provinces do mark exteriorly the grandeur of a Potentate, these are then heroick enterpizes. There is a Horror and Infamy affixt to common Murder, which is subject to the rigor of the Laws, and which by consequence unites not it self with the interest of particular Men, whom these Laws retain in their Duty: But an unjust War, which includes an infinite of Murders, and of Robberies is not, if it be happy, but an object of esteem and admiration.

We must not say here as some, that Injustices consecrate themselves by their Grandeur, and that the excess of the Crime makes the Glory. There would be excess in this Thought: But we may say, that this fantastical inequality of our prejudices upon the same thing, comes from the habit which we have fram'd to our selves of judging Qualities, only by the relation
which

which they have with the state of those who possess them. A Woman is dishonoured for being seduced, and he who is the Author of that seducement, makes it a motive of his Vanity. There is certainly a great deal of extravagance in this prejudice: nevertheless this disorder of our Judgment, is founded upon the Maxim which we have establisht. It is conceived in this World that Men have a thousand ways to make themselves worthy. All the springs of Glory are open to them. A Woman is bounded in that respect, she can neither Govern States nor Command Armies, nor succeed in the Arts, and in the Sciences, at least ordinarily, and the examples of the contrary are too rare for to draw to a consequence: but she may be an honest Woman; it is for that reason that nothing is more honourable in a Woman than Chastity. The Empire of Beauty likewise, which makes the Honor of Women in the World, cannot make that of Man, who is naturally destin'd to something else than to make himself belov'd. It happens even sometimes, that a Vice well-plac'd passes for a great Virtue, and that a Virtue ill-placed passes for the greatest fault. Prodigality sits well upon *Alexander*, who being Master of the World possesses the Treasure thereof. Oeconomy

agrees with *Hanibal*, who makes not his Armies subsist but by a Miracle, shut in as he is on all sides in *Italy*. Cruelty it self, which would ill become him at another time, agrees with him in the condition that he is in. To the rest as it happens, that good Sence, Prudence, Probity, Exactness in keeping ones Word, &c. are qualities which agree with all sorts of States and Conditions; it is not to be wondered at that almost all Men nettle themselves equally thereat. They seek not after their Virtues as being worthy of Man: but as matching very well the State wherein they are, and convenient to their Interests. They seek to have effectively judgment and prudence, because it is the reality and not the simple appearances of these Virtues which are profitable to them, but they content themselves ordinarily in appearing People of probity, because that the appearances of good Faith are more profitable to them, as they do imagine, than the true possession of that Virtue. We have reason to hate Hypocrisie, and to be angry with this imposture of Vice, who seems to have a mind to impose upon God and Men, by an execrable traffick of appearances and outward studies: but we must affirm things as they are; Hypocrisie is a Vice which appears common unto all

all Men. They all study to ppear in the Light, which may be most advantagious to them. It is an error to imagine, that there are none but Hypocrits of Devotion; there are Hypocrites of Honor, of Resolution, of Bravery, of Liberality; and we see more counterfeits in the World, than those who would impose upon the Church. It is something curious to see two Persons who create an acquaintance, or who enter into commerce, take themselves mutually for the Cullies one of another, and say nothing, nor do nothing, but what comes from the design of Cheating. They do affect Politeness, Complaisance, Integrity and Honor, insomuch that they believe they have them. All that certainly comes from a too bounded sight of Self-love; and to get out of Error, he must (as I may say) tread the same steps back again, seek the Man whom he would have shunn'd, and take for Perfection, not that which distinguishes us: but that which matches this natural equality of Perfection and Excellence, which we have with other Men, to consider our selves, not in our selves, but in God.

The Perfections due unto the mortal Man are a small matter, but those of the immortal Man are all worthy of admiration. He has nothing to do with Hypocrisie, for

to counterfeit himself to the eyes of Men; he has nothing to do but to renounce the delusions of his Pride, the vain prejudices of the World and its vails, which rob him of the sight of himself, for to find himself above even admiration.

There is not even to the very passion of Man, that which changeth not it self into Perfections, when they have their just extent in the immortal Man; and if you mind, you will find that the business which is conceived in the Sentiments of our Soul, comes from the too strait bounds which Cupidity and Self love had given them. Give unto the Soul all its flight, let it act in its own extent, and you shall find that it is a Divine Sphere which always augments it self proportionably as it draws nigh unto God.

C H A P. XII.

Wherein the general Vices are treated of, which flow from Self-love; and First of Voluptuousness.

THERE are Three Goods, which principally bind Self-love. The First, which makes it self felt and desired for the love of it self: but which makes not it self felt by it self; it is esteem, and the last which makes not it self felt or desir'd by it self, and has but one goodness of means, for to speak at the School, which is Riches. All that is contain'd in the known division of a good, agreeable, honest, and profitable: unto which must be added a Fourth Good, which seems to contain all those, to wit Dignities, the which according to the Ideas that Men have of them, are a composition of Pleasure, and Glory, and Help for to pass the Life commodiously.

The love of Pleasure is natural, that of Esteem is legitimate, the desire of acquiring Riches, hath in it self nothing criminal: but all these Affections begin to bear the

the name of Vices, so soon as they cease to be guided by Reason.

Self-love binding it self to pleasure against Reason, is call'd voluptuousness. Self-love consider'd in an irregular Love of esteem, bears the name of Pride. Self-love having Riches for its Object, and desiring them with an excessive Passion, is call'd Avarice. In fine, Self-love tending towards Dignities with a passion which offends Reason and Justice, is call'd Ambition : but as the Goods of the World reduce themselves to Pleasure and Glory, the most general irregularities of Self-love, reduce themselves likewise unto Voluptuousness and Pride, the examination whereof will terminate our searching for the present.

Pleasure may be considered in relation unto Man, who has this Sentiment, by relation unto Society, and by relation unto God. For it is certainly necessary in these three respects. It is by pleasure that the Author of Nature has interest'd our Soul in the preservation of our Body. We should forget to reiterate the use of Aliments, if it had not an agreeable Goust. It is pleasure that makes us enter into commerce one with another, whether it be in the *Æconomic* Society, or whether it be in the Civil Society, because it is to
this

his Sentiment that is owing the union of Men, and likewise the propagation of human kind. In fine, it is this pleasure that we find to love God, and to be beloved of him, to hope for his Blessing, and to receive his Graces, and to have Sentiments of his Peace, and of his Love, which makes us have commerce with him.

From thence it follows that Pleasure is criminal, when it is opposed to the Good of Man, who has the Sentiment of it, or to that of Society, or to the Commerce which we ought to have with God.

That poisoned Voluptuousness ought to be plac'd in the First rank, which makes Men purchase long Misery by momentary Pleasures. As the bounty of God appears manifestly, in that he hath affixt Sentiments of Pleasure to Aliment, and unto other things which naturally relate to the preservation of our Bodies; his Injustice also renders it self very sensible in the rigorous scourge of Incontinency. But it is not only Voluptuousness that afflicts the Body, which we ought to look upon as contrary to Man. We ought to make the same judgment of that which weakens, or which troubles the Mind.

We

We ought again to look upon Pleasure as criminal then, when it tends either to destroy Society, or to trouble the order thereof. Such are the voluptuousnesses which are founded upon bad Faith and Infidelity, which establishes in society, the confusion of Race and of Children, and which are followed with jealousies and mistrusts, and very often with murders, and with wicked attempts upon the most Sacred and inviolable Laws of Nature. In fine, we ought to look upon it as a criminal Pleasure, the Pleasure which God forbids, whether It be by his natural Law which he has given to all Men, or whether it be by a positive Law, as likewise Pleasure which weakens, suspends or destroys the commerce we have with him, in binding us too much to the Creatures.

Upon this principle it is not difficult to see, what judgments we ought to make of all the different species of voluptuousness; or to examine all its characters. In general, as Nature has established that the corruption of the best things is always the worst; it is certain likewise, that the more one sort of pleasure is necessary and important to Man in its natural and well govern'd use, the more likewise the ill use of that pleasure is dangerous and criminal. The voluptuousness of the Sight, of the Smell, and

and of the Hearing, it may be is the least of all ; because it destroys not its Being, because it does harm to no body, and it offends not God generally speaking, then when one sees agreeable Objects, or when one smells exquisite Odors, or when one hears melodious Conforts, I say generally speaking ; because there is an infinity of circumstances which may render these pleasures criminal, how innocent soever they may appear in themselves, A Man is criminal in having a passion for Shows, for Scents or Musick, then when he neglects thereby his Affairs, or that he forgets to fulfil the Duties of Society , or in fine, when when the continual use of these pleasures turn him away from the spiritual Commerce which he ought to have with God, without reck'ning that there are several species of voluptuousness very dangerous, which are all hid in the first. Men often believe they seek only the pleasure of the Sight in their fine Gardens, and in their magnificent Houses: and they seek therein the pleasure of Pride and Ambition, telling themselves almost the same that the King of the *Affyrians* said in his proud Heart : *Is not this here Babylon, the great City which I have built by the power of my strength.*

It

It is easie to conceive that the voluptuousness which consists in the excess of good cheer, is much more criminal than that of which we have been speaking of, it ruins the health of a Man, it abases the Mind in the recalling it from the high and sublime contemplations, for the which it is naturally made, unto Sentiments which affix it basely to Tables, as unto the source of its Happiness.

Atque affigit humi divina particulam aura.

But the pleasures of good Cheer consider'd in general, is not by much near so criminal as that of Drunkenness, which not only ruins the Health and abases the Mind: but which troubles our Reason and deprives us for a certain time of the Glorious character of reasonable Creatures. By this dangerous voluptuousness Man pays his Reason, and makes himself responsible for all the faults which the loss thereof may make him commit; so that as there is no mischief but what may attend this loss, so there is no Vice likewise which is not in some sort comprehended in Drunkenness.

The voluptuousness of Love produces not altogether so sensible disorders: but nevertheless one cannot say that it is of

less

less dangerous consequence. Love is a species of Drunkenness for the Mind and the Heart of a Person, who abandons himself to this passion; it is the Drunkenness of the Soul, as the other is the Drunkenness of the Body.

The first falls into an extravagancy which strikes the Eyes of all the World, and the other wanders wide, tho he seems to have the use of Reason. Besides, the first renounces only the use of Reason; whereas this renounces his Judgment and Heart at the same time. I grant nevertheless that hitherto the irregularity of Drunkenness is more sensible, and it may be more great in effect.

But when you come to consider these two Passions in the opposition which they have to the good of Society and Commerce, which we ought to have with God, you will find that irregular Love is in some sort more criminal than Drunkenness, because that this causes but a transitory disorder, whereas that is followed by a durable irregularity. Love is beside oftner the spring of Murder than Wine. Drunkenness is sincere: but Love is essentially composed of Artifice and of Infidelity. In fine, Drunkenness is a short fury which takes us from God, to subject us to our Passions: but illicit Love is a perpetual Idolatry.

Self.

Self-love seeks not only corporal voluptuousness: but it mixes it in an infinite manner of ways, which inhaunces the Goust and augments the Sentiment. The greatest part of Arts are the Ministers of voluptuousness, imployed for to mix colours for the pleasure of the Sight; the Odors and the Essences for to please the Smell; the Instruments, the Tones, and the agreeable and harmonious sounds for to flatter the ear. They make voluptuous mixtures of Colours, of Sounds, of Odors; they make use thereof for to heighten the pleasure of the good Cheer, and they imploy this with all the other agreeable objects for to accompany the pleasures still more criminal, And this pleasure of Sense is so considerable unto Men, that then when they would be consider'd and esteem'd one of another, they search for means to flatter the sense of those who approach them. They have rich and shining Appearances for to please the Eyes, Essences for to flatter the Smell, to have a fine Voice, or for to know to play upon Instruments for to please the Ears. All that enters into esteem which Men have one for another. They confound Voluptuousness with Perfections, and Excellence is not found but in that which diverts us.

Although this voluptuousness appears so much the more criminal as it possesses more our Soul, and so much the more dangerous as it is more common amongst Men; I grant nevertheless, that I am not of the opinion of those, who by subtilties and refin'd speculations, would seem to contest with us the legitimate and natural use of the Creatures; and who do imagine, that either all pleasures are criminal, or that they cannot taste any one without crime, unless they should have the express intention in the same moment, to relate it to the Glory of God. There is an excess in this Thought, there being an infinity of occasions, wherein we may take honest diversions, without our finding therein any relation with the Glory of God. It suffices then, that we use them with acknowledgment, and giving thanks for the Creature, without endeavouring to Spiritualize and consecrate things which are not susceptible of that refinement.

CHAP. XIII.

Wherein are considered divers characters of Voluptuousness.

THE greatest part of Men acknowledge but one part of Voluptuousness, which is that of Sence. They reduce all things to corporal intemperance, and they perceive not that there are in the Heart of Man, as many different sorts of Voluptuousness, as there are species's of pleasure, that it may abuse, and as many different species's of pleasure, as there are passions which activate his Soul.

Avarice, which seems as if it would deprive him of the most innocent pleasures, and adopt in their place but work, fatigue, fear and inquietude, unto his voluptuousness, which indemnifie it for the delights which it hath renounced. (*Populus me sibilat*) says the Miser, whom Horace describes, (*ut ego mihi plaudo ipse domi, dum*

content-

contemplor nummos in arca.) That which is actually in the enjoyment of Temporal Goods in regard of other Men, that very thing is the power of enjoying them in this.

But as there are Passions more criminal some than others, there is likewise a sort of Spiritual voluptuousness which is particularly dangerous. It may be reduced to three sorts; which are the voluptuousness of Hatred and Vengeance, that of Pride and Ambition, that of incredulity and impiety.

It is a voluptuousness of Pride to delight the self in appropriating to our selves, either the Goods which belong not to us, or the qualities which are in us, but are not ours, or a Glory which we ought to attribute to God and not to our selves. As the soul finds a sort of Grief in stripping it self of its Honour for to cloath another, which makes the secret repugnances which hath for Humility, it finds likewise a sort of very sensible pleasure in stripping others of that Glory for to cloath it self.

Men wonder with reason that the People of Rome should find any sort of pleasure in the bloody diversions of the Circle,

when they saw the Gladiators cut each others Throats in their Presence for their recreation : this barbarous pleasure may be lookt upon as a voluptuousness of Ambition and Vainglory. The *Romans* forgot these Combatants were Men for to remember only that they were their Slaves. It was to flatter their Ambition, to see that Men were not made but for their diversions.

There is a voluptuousness of Hatred and of Vengeance, which consist in the joy which the disgraces of other Men give us. It is a horrid pleasure that nourishes it self with the tears that others shed. Nevertheless you shall find if you mind it narrowly, that this pleasure makes not the least part of that which takes with the Men of the World. The degree of this pleasure follows the degree of the hatred which gave it birth. Wherefore a Poet of our time, who knew well enough the heart of Man, expresses the excess of Hatred, by the excess of Pleasure.

*Puissay je de me jeux y voir tomber le foudre
Voir ces maisons en cendres & tes lauriers en
poudre.*

*Voir le dernier Romain à son dernier soupir
Moy seule en être cause & mourir de plaisir.*

If for my sport I could bring Thunder down
Blast all your Laurels, and consume your
Town.

See the last *Roman* sigh out his last Breath,
I should with pleasure yield my self to death.

Incredulity fortifies it self with the pleasure of all the other Passions which attack Religion, and places it self in nourishing favourable Doubts for their irregularities; an impiety which seems to commit the evil even for the evil sake, and without finding any advantage, ceases not to have its secret pleasures, so much the more dangerous as the Soul hides them from it self in the instant that it tastes them the best.

It happens often that an interest of vanity makes us fail of reverence for the Supreme Being. We would shew our selves formidable unto Men, in appearing not to fear God. We Blaspheme against Heaven for to threaten the Earth.

But nevertheless therein is not the Salt that principally seasons Impiety. Man hates God naturally, because that he hates the dependance that submits him to his Empire, and the Law which bounds his desires. This hatred of the Divinity abides

hid in the Heart of Man, where weakness and fear keep it cover'd very often, without even reason perceiving it. This hidden hatred creates a secret pleasure in that which braves the Divinity. Men love the elevation of Wit, which abases that which they look upon as their gods.

Victrix causa Diis placuit, sed viſta Catoni.
Il dédaigne de voir le Ciel qui le trahit.

He disdains to see Heaven that betrayed him.
 All that appear'd brave, because it was impious

I will not oppose so much the Sentiment of those who said, that Fear was the first spring of Superstition, provided that they joyn Hatred to the Fear, as they are very often in the Heart of Man; it being difficult for Men not to hate a little, that which they fear very much. It is certain that Superstition would not be so common in the World, for ordinarily it is fill'd with an extravagancy which is not human, if Men did not get a by-pleasure therein, which they could not receive by reason, and this pleasure consists in a secret satisfaction which they have in seeing the Divinity abased. The Pagans found not only a pleasure

pleasure of Pride in elevating of Men up to the rank of Gods ; they found likewise a pleasure of Hatred and Impiety in abasing the Gods unto the rank of Men ; and it may be likewise that they read not the Fables of their Poets with so much pleasure, which instructed them that Men had been made immortal, as those which feign'd that the Gods had been wounded or defeated by the Arms of Men.

So that he who shall sound well the Heart of Man, shall find that Superstition and Impiety are not so opposite as is imagin'd, and that they are found united in this secret hatred of God, which follows the state of our corruption, and of which we are not healed but by Grace.

As Pride and Hatred of God unite themselves for to form this vast voluptuousness which we seek in Superstition, and that horrid voluptuousness which we find in Impiety ; Pride and Hatred unite themselves likewise for to form the pleasure of Malignity of slandering and calumny.

We find therein a pleasure of Vain Glory, for Men speak evil often of others, for to praise themselves indirectly. There is not a Man in the World who would not praise himself openly if he durst ; but as he fears to prejudice himself by the want

of modesty, he is obliged to have recourse to dextrous and ingenious ways, and to make his merit be taken notice of, without attracting the reproach of too great a vanity, he dares not praise himself openly: but he hopes that in speaking of others, he shall paint himself by an indirect manner; that in testifying of horror for a base action, he will testify how much his Virtue renders him incapable of committing it; and the more he shall blame the Vices of others, the more he will shew himself exempt, and will gain attentions to the opposite Virtues he possesses.

A gross Self-love, and without policy, draws to it self this consequence in saying, for me, although I have great faults, I may boast that I have not that: but an active and prudent Self-love is a better manager of its modesty, and hides often its thundering, but much more the design which it hath in slandering.

But beside this interest of Pride which makes us find pleasure in slandering, there is likewise an interest of Hatred which puts us in this disposition. We look upon other Men as our Enemies, because that we consider them as our competitors in the search of Temporal Goods, You will always find a pleasure in seeing them
abased,

abased, whilst we consider them as capable of disputing any thing with you : but so soon as this opposition ceases, the pleasure which you found in their abasement ceases likewise ; from thence it comes, that Slander has for its object the living, and rarely the dead.

It is easie to judge after this that the pleasure of conversation is not a pleasure so innocent as the vulgar imagine. Indifferent things vex us ; those which interest us give us either a pleasure of Pride, or a pleasure of Hatred, or a pleasure of Impiety, or a pleasure of Ambition, or a pleasure of some other Passion, which will be little less criminal.

As there is a voluptuousness of Conversation, there is likewise a voluptuousness of Thoughts, which has the same spring as the first. It springs from that our Heart prepossessed by certain Passions, has no pleasure but in thinking upon certain objects, and for that effect suspends all our other Reflexions, and all our other Thoughts. Such is the pleasure of a Lover who forgets all things for to think upon the object of his Love. He finds in his amorous contemplations a sort of voluptuousness that destroys it self by the passion, because

cause that the pleasure of Thought gives way unto that of Sentiment.

It is commonly imagin'd, that the distractions which are so ordinary to them that pray to God, or who acquit themselves of other duties of Religion, are the least that they can commit: but they would change their Opinion, if they would thoroughly examine the Spring. For in fine, these distractions are not but from too great a pleasure, which the Ideas of temporal things give us, and from that, as I may so say, we will retain by the voluptuousness of Thought, the objects of the World, which escape us by the suspension of our voluptuousness of Sentiment.

We seek every where pleasure as the Bees seek the Flowers which are their nouriture; and as they find sometimes, that which they seek for in places dirty and marshy, it falls out often enough with us that we find a sort of voluptuousness in laziness, in perils, in labour, and sometimes even in affliction, provided it be not extreme. There is a voluptuousness which might very justly be called the voluptuousness of Complaints and Tears. Men please themselves in bewailing illustrious Persons, the glory of them whom they regret, signalize in some sort those who afflict themselves for their

their loss. They find a pleasure in eternalizing their Grief. They think to give marks of the constancy of their Souls by an inconsolable affliction. In fine, they are glad to make the greatness of their loss remarkt, thinking to interesse the passion of others to make reflexion upon their worth.

In fine, we find a sort of voluptuousness even in laziness, which likewise often enough makes us renounce all others. It springs from a certain softness, which makes us hate the least pain, and the least incommodity. For seeking for pleasure every where, we accustom our selves to think with pleasure. To love and desire with pleasure, to speak with pleasure, to act with pleasure, to seek the society which gives us pleasure, and to shun, in fine, all the occupations which afford us not pleasure. From whence it happens, that the least incommodity makes us despair, being against this strong custom, and suspending the Sentiment of so many different sorts of voluptuousness, whose Idea is always present to our remembrance.

Seek not then for firmness and constancy in voluptuous Souls. They may affect by Pride, strength for to support disgraces: but it is certain that they never get rid of their

their weakness but in getting rid of their voluptuousness. Beside, corporal voluptuousness is more sensible than spiritual voluptuousness: but the latter appears more criminal than the other. For the voluptuousness of Pride is a sacrilegious voluptuousness, which robs God of the Honour which appertains to him, and appropriating it all to it self; The voluptuousness of Hatred is a barbarous and murdering voluptuousness, which is pleased with nothing but desolation and tears, and the voluptuousness of incredulity, and of superstition is as we have already shown, an impious voluptuousness which nourisheth it self with every thing that seems to abase or annihilate the Divinity.

This makes us see first that voluptuousness is as general as our corruption, it being certain that Men who abandon not themselves to one sort of voluptuousness, scarce fails of being slaves unto another. It is a small matter, for example, to defend ones self against the voluptuousness of Sense, than when one abandons one self to that of the Mind, which is more criminal and more dangerous than the other.

It may be concluded in the Second place with a great deal of reason, that it is impossible for one to cure ones self of this vice, purely by temporal motives. For when you shall alledge unto a voluptuous Man the consideration of honor, decency; of his Interest, and his establishment in the World, you may perhaps oblige him to prefer the pleasures of Pride and of Ambition before the pleasures of Sense: But you shall thereby make him pass from one vice to another.

For to find motives capable to make him abandon voluptuousness in all senses and in all ways, you must put him in a condition of passing, if it be necessary, from all the pleasures which he finds in the World, and for that end you must make him make this reflexion, that these pleasures pass away, and that he endures Eternally.

It is certain that voluptuousness has something reasonable enough in the principles of a Man who perisheth. For is it not natural to a Man who shall not be a long time in a state of tasting pleasure, to seek for it whilst he has time. It is the Morality which *Horace* expresses very agreeably.

Vita summa brevis spem vetat inchoare longam.

If Man should inclose all his hopes and all his pretensions in this life, he should have truth and reason in those maxims: But since Man must be after his death, the light of nature teaches us, that he ought to aspire unto Eternal pleasures, which Religion makes him so happily know.

So likewise may one say, that the immortal Man, that is to say, as we have already elsewhere explain'd him, the Man who believes himself Eternal, and who acts by this Principle, renounces Voluptuousness without pain. By the desire which he hath of making himself a Happiness which shall never cease. It is impossible that he should become a slave to the pleasures of Sense, which he knows very well that the Author of Nature employs, as a principle motive for to interesse us in the preservation, or in the propagation of our Body. He makes not his Sovereign good consist in the pleasure of being applauded by a society of Mortal men, no more than a reasonable Man would make his Glory consist in the praise of a Man whom he is to see but a moment. Revenge has no charms for him. With difficulty doth he look upon as his Enemies, the Persons who do him only a temporal prejudice. He supports not impatiently the short dependencies of this life; and so finds not like-
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wise by consequence, a criminal voluptuousness in all that which subjects others thereto ; looking upon his condition as provisional and little durable, which merits little his Care and his Attention. In a word the immortal Man has but very moderate Passions for the objects of this Life, and as the pleasure which he hath in the World is proportioned to the degree of the tye which he hath for these objects; it is easy to conceive, that the situation wherein he is, places him above Voluptuousness.

In which it may certainly be said that he loses nothing, being indemnified advantageously by the commerce of Love, of Acknowledgment, of Zeal, of Joy and Consolation which he has with God, who by the Sentiment of his Holy and ineffable Delights, raises us above our sad and empoison'd Voluptuousness.

A Man clears not himself then of Voluptuousness, neither by Pride, neither by Interest, neither by Revenge, neither by Ambition, as is commonly imagin'd. The Man who shuts himself in the short limits of this Life, shall be voluptuous, do what he can. Let the Pagan Philosophers exhibit as many fine Precepts of Virtue as they please ; let them give us as many remedies as they shall see good against Intemperance,

temperance, their maxims shall be admir'd by the secret relation which they have with our natural dignity, of which they have a confuted knowledge: but Men shall not find themselves disposed to practise them, but in as much as they shall be convinced of their Eternity.

CHAP. XIV.

Wherein are considered the general irregularities of Self-love, and particularly of Pride.

Pleasure and Glory are the two general Goods which season all others, they act then as the Spirit and Salt; differing in that as we have already remarkt, that Pleasure causes it self to be belov'd for the love of it self, whereas Glory makes it self felt but by the Pleasure which accompanies it.

But though we are not sensible of Glory, but by the Pleasure which accompanies it, know not whether it may not be said, that we desire it for it self. At least it is certain that it is not easy to find the first and most antient Reason for the which we love to be esteem'd.

One is not satisfy'd therein, in saying that we desire the esteem of others, because of the pleasure which is affixt to it : for as the pleasure is a pleasure of reflexion, the difficulty subsists, because it remains still to know why this esteem, which is something of a stranger, and at a distance from us, makes our satisfaction.

We succeed no better in alledging the utility of Glory, for although the esteem which we acquire is useful to succeed in our designs, and to procure us divers advantages in society ; there are circumstances wherein this supposition cannot take place. What profit could advantage *Mutius, Leonidas, Codrus, Curtius*, and all those other Heroes, who have given their lives for to acquire Honor ? What could it profit them, the sacrifice which they made unto their Pride of all their Goods, and of Themselves, and by what Interest do those *Indian Women*, who cause themselves to be burnt after the death of their Husbands, seek in despite even of the Laws and Remonstrances, an esteem which they do not survive ?

Some have said upon this subject, that Self-love nourishes with complaisance an idea of our Perfections, which is as its idol, not being able to suffer that which

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opposes this Idea, as disdain and injuries, and seeking on the contrary with passion, all that which flatters it and makes it big, as esteem and praise. Upon this Principle, the utility of Glory should consist in this, that the esteem which other People have of us, confirms the good opinion which we have of our selves:

But that which shews us, that therein doth not consist the only or the principal spring of Love or Esteem, is, that it happens generally that Men make more account of apparent Merit which acquires them the esteem of others, than of real Merit which draws their own esteem, or if you please, that they love better to have faults that are esteemed, than good qualities which are not esteemed in this World, and that besides an infinite number of Persons who seek to make themselves consider'd by qualities which they know very well they have not, that which destroys the Opinion, that they should have recourse to a strange esteem for to confirm the good Sentiments which they have of themselves.

There would be no more reason to imagine that they desire not esteem, but because they would distinguish and elevate themselves above others. It is to explain the cause by the effect. It is not because they

they would distinguish themselves that they seek esteem: but it is because they would be esteemed, that they seek to distinguish themselves in getting out of the croud and obscurity wherein they were before. In fine, it cannot be said that the love of esteem in its general Idea, comes from that Idolatry of Self-love, which makes us to seek to be Eternal and immense as God, framing to our selves an imaginary Eternity in the remembrance of Men, for to save us from the shipwrack of Time, and to perpetuate our selves in spight thereof, and endeavouring to extend our selves to fill the World, in possessing the minds of Men, of our Actions, and of our Grandeur. If it were the only spring of the love of esteem, it would follow that one could not desire the esteem of others innocently, nor by consequence have for infamy but a criminal horror, which is against Reason. Let them seek as much as they will the springs of this inclination, I am perswaded that they will not find the reason but in the wisdom of the Creator. For as God makes use of the love of pleasure for to preserve our Bodies, for to cause propagation, for to unite us one with the other, or to make us sensible of good, and to the preservation of Society wherein we are; there is no doubt likewise, but that his wis-

dom makes use of the love of esteem for to defend us from the baseness of Voluptuousness, and to make us tend to honest and commendable actions, which agree so well with the dignity of our Nature, and at the same time the better to unite us one with another.

This precaution had not been necessary, if the reason of Man had acted alone in him and independent of Sentiment; for this reason could have shown him the honest, and likewise made him have prefer'd it to the agreeable: but because this Reason is partial and judges often in favour of pleasure, affixing Honour and Decency unto that which pleaseth it; it hath pleased the Wildom of the Creator, to give us for judge of our actions, not only our Reason, which suffers it self to be corrupted by voluptuousness; but likewise the reason of other Men, which is not easily seduced.

It is then, because the Author of Nature would that the Reason of other Men should be our Law, and our Judge in some sort, in respect of Moral honesty, and the Decencies of reasonable Nature, which God has form'd to us with a natural desire of making our selves esteem'd of others, which assuredly proceeds thro' the reflexions of our Mind.

For although Utility, Pleasure, the desire of finding confirmations of the good opinion of our selves, &c. may satisfy the love of Esteem, we have made it appear that it produces it not.

And here we may distinguish Three Worlds, which the Wisdom of the Creator has founded upon Three natural Inclinations. The Animal World, the Reasonable World, and the Religious World. The first is a society of Persons united by Sentiment; The second is a society of Persons united by Esteem; And the Third, a society of Persons united by natural Religion. The first hath for Principle the love of Pleasure, the second the love of Esteem, and the third Conscience. All these three Principles are natural, and the reason is not to be sought for but in the Wisdom of the Creator.

The first of these three Worlds relate to the second, the second to the third, and the third to the first. There is then this subordination in these things, that Esteem regulates the love of Pleasure, and that Religion ought to regulate the love of Esteem; and this Subordination is not less natural than these Inclinations.

One might in effect attribute unto Nature the love of Pleasure: one ought not to set upon its score the overflowings of

Voluptuousness. One may say that the love of Esteem is natural; but one must not believe that the extravagancies and the furies of Pride spring out of the bosom of Nature. One might attribute to it the fear of God and the love of Virtue: but one must not give it for a younger Brother's portion, all the Superstition, which it hath pleased Men to charge upon the principles of Nature; and by consequence it is necessary; that the love of Pleasure, that of Esteem, Conscience, should have their Law, their Rules and their Limits. And it will be good to stop at the love of Esteem.

CH A P. XV.

Wherein are examined all the irregularities which enter into the composition of Pride.

IT seems that hitherto we have not too well known Pride, and that without doubt for not having well distinguished all the parts, and in not having carefully enough examin'd all its characters.

Pride

Pride in general may be reduced into five principal Branches, which are the love of Esteem, Presumption, Vanity, Ambition and Fierceness. For although Men are accustomed to confound these terms, and to make use of them indifferently for to signify the same thing; it is certain that these expressions have significations a little different.

The love of Esteem is legitimate and natural in it self, as we have already remarkt: but it is vicious and irregular when it goes to excess. It is here is the most general irregularity of Pride. For when one desires Esteem with Excess, it is natural that one should seek in ones Self estimable qualities, and that then when one has none, that one should give it by complaisance, which the imagination has for the bents of the Heart. From whence springs Presumption. Besides, this immoderate love of Esteem makes a Man endeavor to render himself worthy by all sorts of means, and in default of true springs of Glory, he makes himself esteemed by things which are not estimable, or which are not but in our imagination, see here what our own vanity does; for this expression originally signifies the vacuum of Objects, where we seek Esteem falsely, and which are ill springs of Glory. From this

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excessive love of Esteem springs in the Third place the desire which we have of elevating our selves above others, being perswaded that we cannot attract the consideration of Men with a little lustre, whilst we are confounded with the croud. It is this which produces ambition. In fine, the desire which we have to appear in distinguishing our selves from others, makes us despise them, seeking to abase them, for to draw our selves out of the equality with them. It is from thence springs fierceness. All the irregularities of Pride reduce themselves to the excessive love of Esteem, as to their first Principle, we cannot consider the last with too much care. The two general faults of this inclination are excess and irregularity; the first consists in this, that we love Esteem too much: and the second is this, that we love false Esteem as true Esteem.

For to comprehend what is excess of Love of Esteem, we must consider the design which God had then, when he put this bent in our Heart, he gave it us for the preservation of our Bodies, for the good of Society, and for the exercise of Virtue. I say, for the preservation of our Bodies; because that the love of Esteem forbids us the overflowings of corporal Voluptuousness, which would cause very suddainly

suddenly our death. For who doubts that the desire which we have of making our selves esteem'd one of another, is not a powerful motive to secure us from abandoning our selves to debauchery and sensuality, towards which the love of pleasure draws us, and which is so fatal even to our Bodies. He has put this Bent in us even for the good of Society; for it is this desire of making our selves esteem'd one of another, which renders us civil and complaisant, obliging and honest, which makes us love decency and sweetness of commerce; and who knows not on the other hand, that it is unto this natural desire of Glory, that we owe the fine Arts, the most sublime Sciences, the most wise Governments, and the most just establishments; and in general, almost whatever is admirable in Society? Let them not imagin that it is our corruption and cupidity, which have done this great good to Men. —The wise instructions of the Author of Nature, have without doubt therein their great share.

In fine, it is certain that the design of God has been to carry us to honest and commendable actions, in giving us for judge of our conduct, not only our Reason, which often suffers it self to be corrupted by Voluptuousness: but more, the Reason

Reason of other Men, who are not so partial for us as we are for our selves. In effect we may consider God as the Author of Society, or as the Author of Religion. As the Author of Society, he would have Men enter into commerce one with another for some time; and in this regard, he has given them inclinations which were necessary for the good and preservation of that society. The love of Pleasure and that of Esteem are of the number. This later makes the human Virtues, which ought not to be cry'd down so much as they ordinarily are. For if they serve not to Eternal Salvation, they are destin'd to the good of temporal Society; they come from the design of the Author of Nature; they make part of his Model; the love of Esteem being the means which he uses for to perfect Society, as the love of pleasure is destin'd to form it. For Religion it has its ends more sublime; for it undertakes to direct Man toward the eternal and infinite Good.

From thence it follows, that the love of Esteem is excessive, when it tends to destroy the Body instead of preserving it; in the second place, when it goes to trouble the good and order of Society, instead of maintaining it, and in fine, when it makes us violate the Laws of Virtue instead of making us practise them.

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There is a pretty example of the first found in Duels. It is in my opinion a very extravagant point of Honor that, which would have a Man love Glory and despise Life, which is the foundation, and in some sense the end as we have already seen.

What would Esteem signify to a Man, when he shall be no more in a state of enjoying his reputation? This Honor is nothing but by life. Life is something, even without this Honor; and God himself has found it good to make us know by his conduct, that that is more to be esteem'd than this, for he makes us not love Honor, but by a way, which is that of Glory, and he makes us love Life by Pleasure, and by Glory at the same time.

That if it be answer'd here, that it is not so much the love of Esteem as the fear of Contempt, which makes them expose themselves to death for to revenge themselves of an outrage which they have receiv'd, and that it is natural to a Man of Honor, not to be able to live over-loaded with Infamy; that answer doth not satisfy, because that as it is a weakness not to be able to support grief, it is one then, and not less, not to be able to suffer contempt, above all unjust contempt, and what one has not merited.

At bottom we find that the love of Esteem appears irregular in all respects in this example. For it is to love Esteem too much, it is to love false Esteem, and it is to love more than ones Life, and by consequence more than the preservation of ones Body, more than the society from which one takes a member, or very many members by the fury of these infamous combats, and in fine more than Virtue; because that it is to love it more than Humanity, then Justice, then Charity, and then Moderation.

I know that when it is required of a Man to give his Life for the good of Societies, as for the service of a Prince, who represents the latter and has the right in his hands, he must not ballance a moment the exposing of his Life: but it is not then Esteem, it is Virtue which he prefers to his Life, he follows the design of the Author of Nature, he conforms himself unto his Model, and to his Will, because that he who hath made us, hath made us in subordination and in dependance. All the evil comes from this, that Men know not Honour well, and love it without knowing it. They have nothing but a confused Idea, which education, the examples and judgments of others change incessantly. Honour contains three things

things in its ordinary Idea, that is a sentiment of its excellence, a love of its Duty, and a desire of being esteemed. A Man of Honour, must be sensible of Virtue and Merit, and that by consequence he finds himself offended at the contempt which is had of him. He must love his Duties, even to expose himself to the greatest dangers for to fulfil them, and he must love the esteem of the reasonable World, and he must strive to merit it.

This general Idea is just: but the application which Men make thereof is ordinarily false, for they fail in not giving attention to their true merit, which is much greater than they imagine, in not having an Idea of their Duties, which goes further than they imagine, and in not knowing to discern false Esteem from the Esteem that is true, which is that unto which they ought to aspire.

I know not nevertheless, if in their irregularities Men have not, I know not what confus'd Sentiment of their natural Dignity, which joyning it self to their false prejudices of Esteem and worldly Glory, makes the impatience, or rather the fury with which they receive the outrages which are done them. A Man of so low a Merit, and so despicable as is that of the Man who perishes, who ever he be, would he
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find so great a horror in the abasement? and would he be angry with so much excess to be turn'd to nothing, which follows him on all sides? no, there is in Man an instinct, which perpetually tells him of what he is, and which renders him sensible of every thing which offends the Idea, which he has of his perfections.

Besides, it is certain that this Glory unto which we aspire, contains several different Sentiments which compose it, they are distinguish'd into four, which are Esteem, Consideration, Respect, and Admiration. Esteem is the tribute which is render'd to proper qualities and to personal merit. Consideration has for object not only the merit of the person, but likewise the exterior qualities, as Birth, Riches, Reputation, Power, Credit, and generally all the advantages which makes the difference of conditions, and the distinction of persons in society. Respect is but a great Consideration, and Admiration but a great Esteem. The finest Glory, or at least the properest consists in Esteem and Admiration: but the most sensible and the most noted Glory, is that which consists in Consideration and Respect. The reason of it is, that all the World is not in a state of discerning a Man, who has Merit from another who has none; whereas every one

one may distinguish a great Lord from a common Person.

It is certain that there is not a Man in the world unto whom these Sentiments are not due, when his natural Excellency and Dignity is considered. There is Esteem and Admiration due to the Perfections which it hath pleased God to grant unto Man. There is Consideration and Respect due to the rank which God makes him hold in the Universe: But this original Glory of Man has been darken'd, and as it were effaced by sin; and here we cannot but consider with surprize the prodigious Irregularities of Man corrupted, when we see that his Pride begins, as I may so say, where his Glory ended, that his humility ended there where his true baseness began.

It is something admirable to see Men employed in doing civilities to one another, and censuring each other, whilst they are equally worthy of Eternal reproach.

It is not to be wondred at, that God who would preserve Society, even after the corruption of Men, should not have taken away from us this natural inclination, which we have of being esteemed of others, and which makes, as we have already said, the perfection of commerce which we have with them.

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You must reckon for nothing the example of those Philosophers, who have been seen to despise the Esteem of other Men so far, as to esteem themselves miserable, when they hapned to attract it. It may be that these Heroes in Humility, did not despise so much the Glory in effect, as they appear'd to despise it in the Eyes of Men. *Cicero* says that of all those who had wrote Books upon the contempt of Glory, not one had forgot to insert his name. It is a policy of pride to go retrograde to Glory. When a Man makes profession that he would be esteemed, he finds in his way an infinite number of envious and Rivals, who giving attention unto his design, dispute vexatiously with him so much the more, to take from him the esteem of others, as he wishes it with more ardour: but when a Man appears to condemn the Esteem of the World, which is affected by so many persons, then as he goes willingly out of the rank of those which aspire thereto, they consider him with complaisance, they love his disinterestment, and they would make him accept by force, that which he makes a semblance of refusing.

Gloria, says St. Augustin, sequitur fugientem.

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Besides there has been at all times a sort of contestation between Merit and Fortune, for to know which of the two should take place in the path of Glory. The Great ones of the World are in possession of the most shining Honours by the privilege of Fortune, which attracts ordinarily the officiousness of the multitude.

The Philosophers maintaining the rights of Virtue and Wisdom against Fortune, have made a party of Men confederated, as I may say, against Grandeur; not being able to obtain it, they have taken part with those who condemn it. They have appear'd to reverence Cupidity which makes us run after them who distribute the goods of Fortune, for fear that their officiousness might be a tacit confession of their inferiority; and because that the great number did condemn them by their interess'd conduct, they have chosen rather to condemn the esteem of the vulgar; but let them change conditions and they will change sentiments.

Besides, the Irregularity comes principally from this, that we think so much to make our selves esteemed of Men, that we think not of making our selves approved of God; It is not that the approbation of God doth not appear to us at the bottom, more precious than the esteem of Men:

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but because for to acquire the esteem of Men, it is not necessary that our Heart be changed, it is sufficient that we disguise our selves to the eyes of others, whereas we cannot make our selves approv'd of God, but in changing the foundation of our Heart, then it is a little enterprise of our Self-love to counterfeit: but it is an extream difficult one to resolve seriously to be other than what one is.

CH A P. XVI.

Wherein is considered the Second irregularity of Pride.

THE excessive desire we have of making our selves esteem'd of other Men, makes us desire with passion to have estimable qualities, and fear extreamly having of faults, which wrongs us in the judgment of Men, or to betray our selves in not giving an opinion advantageous enough of our selves. Then when we perswade ourselves that we have the qualities which we desire, or fear, too strongly, it happens that we conceive too good an opinion of our selves, or fall into an excessive diffidence. The first of these two faults is called Presumption.

tion. The second Timidity. These two faults which seem opposite, come both from the same spring, or rather they are but one and the same fault under two different forms. Presumption is a confident Pride; and Timidity a Pride which fears to betray it self. We have a bent both to one and the other, according to the diversity of our constitution. The Blood makes a Man ordinarily perswade himself what is advantageous. It is the principle of confidence. Melancholy makes a Man believe all that he is apprehensive of, that brings forth our diffidencies: but both diffidence and confidence are all grafted upon Pride, because that all comes from the excessive love of Esteem, which is the most antient of its irregularities.

All the World believes that a presumptuous Man esteems himself too much: but we think that we may say against the sentiment of the World, that he esteems not himself enough; and that he fails by an excess of baseness; and not by an excess of elevation disproportion'd unto that which he is. He perceives himself not in effect, that there is in him a greater excellence, than that which makes the attention of his vanity, and that the merit of the Man that perishes is a small matter, compar'd to the merit of the immortal Man.

It must not be wondred at nevertheless that he had rather consider himself by relation unto Time, than by relation unto Eternity, because that in the first of these two prospects, he usurps the Glory of God, in attributing all to himself, and nothing to the Supreme Being, whereas in the prospect of Eternity, he is obliged to uncloath himself of all his Glory for to give it unto God; a strange blindness which permits him not to acknowledge that there is no other true happiness, than that which is mixt with the Glory of God.

I grant nevertheless, that he may esteem himself too much in one sense; and that it is common to see persons who have immoderate pretensions for human Glory, to agree thereto; we need but remember what has been already said, that the love of esteem has been grav'd in our Hearts by relation unto society; for from thence it follows, that reasonably these have the greatest share of that exterior Glory, who do most good to Society, and who are most considerable to the publick, be it by their services, be it by their places, be it by the eminence of rank unto which Providence may have affixt domination. The Great have reason to pretend to homages, because all that, measures it self by relation unto Society; but they would be

very vain and very little reasonable, if they should think that the interior fund of their merit should be greater than that of other Men; and if they should not acknowledge, that it is here a preference of Order, and not a preference of Excellence. For one word more, the advantages of the Man that perisheth are nothing, compared to those of the Man who perisheth not, and it must be very much that all the temporal society of Men, with its divers Governments, its Power, its Dignities, &c. weigh not so much as the immortality of one single Man.

C H A P. XVII.

*Of the Third irregularity of our Pride,
which composes our vanity.*

THE excessive love of Esteem deceives us, not only in perswading us that we have good qualities, which we have not in effect: but likewise in making us take for the springs of Glory, either estimable Goods, or Objects which are not so in any manner.

The term of Vanity is consecrated by use to represent equally the disposition of a Man who attributes to himself qualities which he hath, and to that of a Man who endeavours to do himself Honor by false advantages : but here we restrain it to this last signification, which is that which has more relation with the original of the expression.

It seems that Man is become vain since that he has lost the springs of his true Glory; in losing that state of Sanctity and Happiness wherein God had placed him, for not being able to renounce the desire of making himself esteem'd, and finding nothing estimable in himself since sin, or rather not daring more to cast a fixed eye and strong regard upon himself, since he finds himself culpable of so many crimes and the object of the vengeance of God, he must therefore spread himself abroad, and he must seek to make himself Honour, in cloathing himself with exterior things : and in that Men do so much the more voluntarily agree, as they find themselves naturally so naked and so poor, the one as the other.

I find that the condition of Man in this regard doth not ill resemble that of a Monarch stript of his Treasures, who endeavours

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vours to give a course to Copper-money, having no more Gold nor Silver.

It is that which will appear to us, if we consider that the springs of Glory amongst Men, reduce themselves, either to things indifferent in that respect, or if you will, which are not susceptible, neither of blame nor of praise, or unto things ridiculous, and which are very far from making us true Honour, and are very proper for to denote our abasements, or unto things criminal, and which by consequence cannot be but shameful in themselves, or in fine, to things which draw all their Perfection and their Glory from the relation which they have with our weakneses and our defects.

I place in the first rank Riches, altho' they have nothing contemptible, they have nothing likewise of Glory in themselves.

Our covetous and interess'd desire never informs it self of the spring, nor of the use of Riches which it sees in the hands of others; it is sufficient for it that they are rich for to have its first homages; and although it profit not actually of their Riches, it hinders it not from respecting them by the possibility there is that it may profit one day.

But if it would please our Heart to pass from a confus'd Idea to a distinct one, it would be often enough surpris'd at the

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extravagance of its Sentiment; for as it is not essential to a Man to be rich, and that there must be some cause that should give him wealth, it will find often that it esteems a Man, because that his Father was a wicked Man, or because that he hath been himself a knave; and that then when it renders its exterior homages to Riches, it salutes the Theft, or praises Infidelity and Injustice.

It is true that this is not Mans intention, he follows his cupidity rather than his Reason: but a Man to whom you make court, is he obliged to correct throughout all these distinctions, the baseness of your procedure, and to separate that which your Interest gives him, from that which your Reason should give him, if it consulted it self. No, no, he receives your exterior respects as a tribute which you render to his excellence; as your avidity has deceiv'd you, his pride fails not of illuding him. If his Riches augment not his Merit, they augment the opinion that he has thereof, in augmenting your complaisance, he takes all at the foot of the letter, and fails not of interiorly aggrandizing himself from that which you give him, whilst you enrich your self, but very little with that which he gives you: it is not that one cannot find something in riches, which seems

to render them an object of esteem to our Eyes, as there is something in poverty which seems to render it an object of our contempt; and that in my opinion 'tis the first acquires us a sort of power, which elevates us above others, and makes us easily go beyond them; whereas poverty puts us in a state of necessity and weakness, which makes us not exceed others: but in that it may be said, that Wealth is not glorious but by our Ambition, and that Poverty is not shameful but by our Pride.

We do not nevertheless by that, approve the proceeding of those, who cannot suffer that God should bless other persons without setting himself against them; they turn themselves on every side, they examine their faults with care, they pardon themselves nothing; certainly if the esteem which Men have for Riches came from Self-love, this contempt which they affect having for rich persons, is always a mark of envy; and this envy is in it self extremely shameful: at bottom, the dependance of Interest is a great deal better than that of envy; and it is better to give way voluntarily unto those from whome one expects good, than to put ones self under them, and make them as it were a forced homage,

age, by the displeasure one has at their prosperity which one envies.

A Man ought not to esteem Riches but according to the good or bad use which he makes thereof : it is in the same manner we would that he should consider Birth, Authority and Dignities; all these things put Men in an engagement of doing commendable actions. If you fulfil the Duties unto which they engage you, they are to you the springs of Glory; if you answer ill to the Law they impose on you, they serve but to cover you with infamy.

Those who being arrived at some degree of shining prosperity, grow drunk with their grandeur, refine very little in Sentiment from vain Glory; an apparent moderation which would seem to say, that they are above the things which elevates them, would it not do them a great deal more honor than this ill understood fierceness, which makes us think that they are below their fortunes, since they know so little how to bear it? that is so much the more surprising that it is not alone unto them who are not enough enlighten'd for to know the wrong which this proceeding does them, that it happens to know themselves ill: but likewise unto them who know perfectly this Truth; the reason dignities

then is, that Men when they come to any dignities change their places interiorly, if I may so say; Pride placing them in a more elevated Post than that which they enjoy'd before. The mind may to little purpose counsel them to appear as in the same place, and to affect for their Glory an equality of Soul, which hinders them from remarking the growings of their fortune; as Men guide themselves much more by the Sentiment of Heart, than by the lights of their Judgment; it happens that insensibly they forget the refin'd designs of their vanity, and follow the bent which they have in profiting by all their advantages. Those who have grown old in Grandeur, or who are born in the brightness of elevated fortune, are not altogether so subject to these dazlings of vain glory; because that their Soul being accustomed to see it self above others, is no longer so attentive to make the difference taken notice of, which distinguishes them from 'em; but it is not to be imagin'd with the vulgar, that these persons have more humility and modesty than the others. They would shew the same insolence, if they did apprehend as the others, that their elevation were not enough remarkt. They owe their civility to a confirm'd Opinion, and that they think their superiority incontestable, and that
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you may not doubt thereof, you shall see that the same persons who are so civil towards those who are extreamly below them, are fierce and insupportable, when they have to do with People, who approach their condition: that comes assuredly from this, that the civilities which they shew unto persons who are very much inferior to them, appears to them of no consequence; they are assured that they will not take their civilities at the bottom of the Letter; and they can acquire the reputation of civility without doing prejudice to their rank: but it is not the same thing when they have to do with Men, who may enter into some sort of compitition with them; as the distance which separates them from the latter is not very great; their Pride seems to augment it as much as it can possibly, and makes them do a thousand things which are neither reasonable nor natural, for to make all the world take notice of this, that they fear it should not be enough taken notice of.

There is one sort of temporal advantages which we take for the springs of Glory, altho' in themselves, and separate from the use which Men make of them, they merit neither esteem nor practice: but there must be added thereto, that Man makes himself very often valued by ways which make him ridiculous.

I will not only speak here of those, who affect to have qualities which they have not, altho this be that, which makes properly that which we call ridiculous people, or originals: Men give this quality to whomever they please: and laugh at the expence of whom they please: it may be if there were an order of reasonable creatures exempt from our defects, they would find that the ridiculousness of human Nature, is not so bounded as we imagine our selves. Man, consider'd in his natural Perfections, is assuredly a work of God, most worthy of admiration: but it is because that he is admirable in one sense, and that he finds himself ridiculous in another. Is there any thing, for example, worse matcht with our natural Dignity, than the vanity which has for object the luxury of Cloaths; and is not this something more ridiculous, that all this which makes Men laugh at, that imbroidery and gilding should enter into the formal reason of Esteem. That a Man well cloathed should be less contradicted than another; that an immortal Soul should give its esteem and consideration to Horses, to Equipages, to Furniture, to Liveries, &c. and that the ornament of the Body should have for inheritance the glory which appears to us to be the most shining ornament of our Souls. Cicero mocks it, he calls

a Man who forgot the Glory of his protection to tye himself to this ridiculous Vanity. *Vir in dicendis causis bene vestitus*: But he ought not so much to have derided a Man who follow'd the common prejudice, as Men in general, who might be reproached, that their want of glory is so great, that they seek it even in that which by its first destination, ought to cover their shame and their nakedness. The adress of Dancing, for which there are People who value themselves seriously, is one of the qualities, which would render us ridiculous, if we would render ourselves in that high and sublime situation wherein Nature and Religion places us. An immortal Soul which danceth and leapeth, is an object equally frightful and ridiculous. It is true, that this appears not ridiculous, because it is too general. Men never laugh at themselves; and by consequence they are little struck by this universal ridiculousness which all may be reproacht of, or at least the greatest number: but their prejudice changes not the nature of things, and the ill matching of their actions with their natural Dignity, for being hid from their imagination, is not the less true.

That which is most sad, is, that Men make themselves now only valued by ways which

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which would render them ridiculous, if they could consider them as they ought; but let them seek to make themselves esteem'd by crimes.

We have already said elsewhere, that they affix scandal unto unfortunate crimes, and esteem unto crimes which succeed. They condemn in a single Man, Theft and Robbery, which lead him unto Power: but they love in a Potentate great thefts and shining injustices, which conduct him to the Empire of the World.

Old *Rome* is a famous example of this Truth, it was in its birth a Colony of robbers, who sought there the impunity of their crimes.

It was afterwards a Republick of Highway-men, who extended their injustices through all the earth. Whilst these Robbers do nothing but spoil Passengers, banish from a little corner of the earth Peace and publick security, and enrich themselves at the expence of some Persons whom they find in their way. Men give them not too honest Names, and they pretend not likewise unto glory, but only to impunity: but so soon as by the favour of a bright prosperity, they see themselves in a condition of stripping entire Nations, and of illustrating their injustices and their fury, in dragging at their Chariots Princes and Sovereigns;

Sovereigns ; there is no more question of impunity, they pretend to Glory ; they dare not only justify their famous Robberies, but they consecrate them. They assemble, as I may say, the Universe in the pomp of their Triumphs, for to lay out the success of their crimes, and they open their Temples, as if that would make Heaven an accomplice of their Murders and Fury.

There are besides an infinite number of things, which Men esteem not, but by relation they have with some of their weaknesses. Voluptuousness makes them sometimes find Honor in a debauch. The rich are debtors to the desires of the poor for the consideration which they find in the World. Might draws its price in part from a certain power of doing what it will, which is the most dangerous Present which can ever be made unto Men. Honour and Dignity draw their principal luster from our ambition ; and so it may be said most certainly, that the most part of things are not glorious, but because we are irregular.

C H A P. XVIII.

Wherein is continued the examination of the characters of the vanity of Men.

Vanity appears enough in all these things, without our being at too much trouble to find it. For what blindness is not this in Man to make himself valuable by advantages, which compose not the merit of his Person, or by the things which are not susceptible in him, neither of esteem nor of contempt, or things which render us ridiculous, in shewing the extreme disproportion that there is between that which we are, and that which we ought to be, or in fine by criminal things, and by consequence essentially shameful.

But it seems then that there may be another judgment made of the qualities of the Soul, which are reduced to the intellectual qualities which appertain to the understanding, or to moral virtues which appertain to the heart, because that the one and the other enter in some sort into the composition of Man, and make that which is called personal Merit.

Nevertheless, when we shall consider things nearer, we shall find that there wants very much, of those true springs of Glory, which are commonly imagined therein. When it shall be granted to the Philosophers, who have chosen this kind of advantages for to make themselves esteem'd, that there is something more pure in their pretended Glory, than that, that fortune and the prejudices of the vulgar affix unto exterior Goods, we shall convince them of vanity, and it may be that at bottom they will appear little more reasonable than the rest of Men.

The natural qualities are the Memory, the Mind, and the Judgment; the acquir'd qualities are either the Sciences, or the Arts, and in general, the knowledge of experience, or speculations which adorn our Mind, in making it know that which it knew not before, or which serve to the use of life. Memory is in a manner counted for nothing in matter of vain-glory. Men do not pretend that this is a very great means for to make themselves valuable; that which shews it, is that they think they may boast of their having a good memory, without too much want of Modesty, and they fear not doing themselves wrong in acknowledging that they have abundance; the cause must be attributed to
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to this, that their being in Man two sorts of Faculties, the inferior and the subaltern Faculties, and the Faculties which direct and Govern; we naturally make more account of the Faculties which govern, than of the Faculties which serve, such is the memory, which does nothing but furnish Memoirs to the understanding: besides, we have heard say that there are divers Appartments in the mind of Man, and that when he swells one he seldom fails of streightning the others; it is therefore believ'd that in wanting of Memory, he shall appear to have Wit and Judgment. In general it is certain that he acknowledges not his faults, but either to acquire to himself a glory, by the merit of that acknowledgment which he esteems more than the quality which he acknowledges he has not, or for to appease the pride of others by an apparent humility, and for to oblige them by an artificial disinterestment to render the justice which is due to him.

Men value themselves much for Wit, and as little for Memory; that appears both by the sensibility which they shew, when they are reproacht with the want thereof, and by the delicate precautions their modesty takes, for to shew that they have it without boasting. A Man who should say I

have a great deal of Wit, would be insupportable to others; but he should say nevertheless, but what he ordinarily thinks. But he must disguise his Thoughts, and endeavour to obtain a praise unto which he seems not to aspire.

Without doubt Man is debtor enough to this sort of vanity; because that he owes to it a great many agreeable productions, without counting the pleasure which he takes in the conversation of Persons, who act or speak by this motive: but sometimes likewise this vanity becomes disagreeable and tiresome.

From whence comes the habit Men take of contradicting in conversation; if it be not from a secret desire that they have of perswading that they have more light than others, and that they understand better than they the things they speak of, or at least from a strong perswasion that they have in themselves. They contradict those more voluntarily than others, who take the ascendant in company, because that for pride they cannot suffer the pride of them who think themselves more enlightened than others; they will contradict more freely in a numerous company, where there are several witnesses of what they say, than when they are face to face, with a person with whom they cannot enter into contestation

testation without disadvantage, because he will be Judge and Party at the same time. And it happens likewise that they contradict, when they have no great matter to say, for when they cannot shew their Wit, they endeavour at least to oppose the glory of those who seek to make theirs appear. It is unto this same principle that we attribute the liberty which the greatest part of Men give themselves, of condemning the conduct of their Superiors, in that there is without doubt injustice and blindness; there is injustice, because they judge of that which they know not, and which they cannot know, it not being possible that private Men, who are not entred into the Counsels of those that Govern them, should know if it be not very imperfect, the reasons which these latter have for what they do. I add that there is blindness, because that it is ordinarily seen that those very persons who erect themselves as Judges and Censors of the actions of their Masters, make pitiful faults, as soon as they are call'd themselves unto some like employ; and how should they not make, faults, because they cannot form a just and right judgment upon all that they see; the great rule for the commonalty of Mankind, being that they are always to blame when they are miserable, and that they are al-

ways worthy of esteem and praise, then when they are favour'd with fortune, who know not nevertheless that there is an unhappy ability, which they confound with ignorance, and a happy ignorance which obtains the glory of ability. I will say more, and boldly maintain it, that there are few great events which are due to the prudence of Men. It is the concurrence of circumstances which makes the good fortune of great actions, there are Heroes of fortune, if I dare express myself thus, and which are likewise greater in number than the Heroes of merit.

Besides the Wit taken for this vivacity of imagination, which makes us conceive things with fire, and makes us produce them with facility, has a sort of incompatibility with the judgment: it happens rarely but that these impetuous imaginations precipitate us instead of guiding us. They are the false Lights, which lead us towards Precipices. The wit to define it in a word, is an instrument in the hand of the Passions to do great faults.

I say not the same thing of the Judgment, which is without doubt of all the intellectual qualities the most estimable. We are certainly deceiv'd, when we attribute great things to the Wit; it is not the Wit, but the Judgment which governs States,

States, which disciplines Armies, which excels in negotiations, which succeeds in Arts and Sciences: but not for to make two qualities fight which are in no wise opposite, it must be said, that Wit is the perfection of the Judgment, and Judgment in its turn the perfection of Wit, with this difference nevertheless, that Judgment without the Wit is something, whereas Wit without Judgment, is much less worth than nothing.

That which deceives the greatest part of Men, is that they imagine upon a popular prejudice, that Wit is rare, and that good Sense is very common; and it is just quite contrary; the Wit which imagines, which invents, which likewise refines, and which subtilizes in all things is common enough: but good Sense which compares, which examines, which weighs, which considers the tenets and tendency of things, and determines not but when it has good reason to determine, is the most rare thing in the World.

Almost all Men have Wit, there is not even a passion which doth not inspire Men therewith, and even Wine it self sometimes gives them vivacity: but there is hardly a Man who wants not Judgment, because there is hardly any one, who desires that which is truly profitable to him

from that which imports him not. They may have a good Sense in the choice of the means which they imploy; but they have not in that of the end which they propose.

As even in the World Vivacity makes the Hair-brain'd, and Judgment persons truly able; it is no wonder if it be found in Religion, that good Sense believes, and Wit is incredulous; that is because the latter determines upon the least appearances, without staying for any more, whereas the Judgment compares and examines all things before it determins.

The Learned Men have in vain endeavoured to gain a veneration for Knowledge, by the interest which they have of making that respected, which distinguishes them from others; I know not if in attracting the vain approbation of the vulgar, they have found the secret of satisfying themselves. If that be, Vanity must come to the succor of Science. For I pray what does the greatest part of things profit, which we instruct a Man in who is made for Eternity? What is it that the human Sciences teaches us? the Words, the Etymologies, the Dates, the Facts which regard us no more, or which serve but to shew that we know them, the vain questions, either ridiculous or dangerous,

gerous, the speculations without end, an infinity of fictions and lies, and almost nothing that is profitable to us, and with which our Soul might nourish it self. How comes this besides, that the greatest part of Men know these things in so troubled and confused a manner; that these pretended knowledges serve but to cast them into wandering? One need but have the confused Idea of things and a great deal of vanity, for to be perpetually in error; and it is certain that ordinary Learning gives the one and the other, for it is impossible to give any distinction unto knowledges which are hudled in so great a number; and it generally happens that they puff up themselves by the acquisition of this dark booty, as if they had reason to facilitate themselves with the acquisitions of new prejudices and new errors; and as if the abundance of knowledge, which hinders the justness and rightness of the Judgment, were as much worth as their clearness and their distinction, which produces an effect quite opposite. In that they make advantage of the error of the vulgar who are used to confound these things: but impose them not on people truly able and enlightned, neither have they reason to be too well satisfied themselves; even they themselves who knew,
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best what they know, who joyn natural qualities to acquir'd, and who have accustomed themselves to refine by the exactness of a diligent meditation the knowledges which clouds the brain of others by their confusion, gain not at bottom a greater fruit of their Studies, than to know how much the knowledge of Man is bounded, they find themselves surrounded on all sides by impenetrable Abysses ; they cannot go one step without finding a difficulty, the number of their distinct knowledges is little ; besides, these knowledges are as it were buried in almost an infinite number of prejudices and errors, from which they must be separated ; and that which is more sad still, is, that if the knowledge of this character enlighten their Mind more than others, it is not seen that they serve more, at leastwise ordinarily, to the satisfaction of the Heart. There are, said an Antient, who know meerly for to know, it is the effect of an unprofitable curiosity. *There are some who acquire Knowledge for to acquire Honors or Riches, it is a shameful traffick ; in fine, there are some who know for to make their Knowledge appear, it is the effect of a very great vanity.*

In fine, it may be said, that ordinary Science is unprofitable in nature, dangerous often enough in society, pernicious

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in the Heart, and almost ever mortal in Religion; it is unprofitable in Nature, you may reason upon the cause of Storms, and of Sicknes, upon the nature of Time and the certainty of death: but you cannot avoid any thing of all this. It is often dangerous in Society, because that therein it excites Troubles and Disorders. From thence it came that *Augustus* in the draught of Politicks, which he left to his Successors, would have them banish Philosophy from the Republick, because that the drunkenness of their pretended Wisdom was wont to make them contemn Authority. It is dangerous in the Heart, since it generally costs us our Humilty, and mortal in Religion, because that it sets it self up for Judge of Revelation, and would have us know by our selves, that which Faith perceives not but upon the testimony, of God.

The incredulous Triumph in that they rarely see people of an extraordinary distinguished condition believe that which the vulgar believes in regard to the mysteries of Religion. Let them not deceive themselves; the objection is not so strong as they imagine. For a knowing Man is not, for to define him exactly, but a Man who has more errors and prejudices than other Men, and prejudices so much the more dan-

dangerous, as he is at a greater distance from knowing them by the preventions of his Pride; his great Reading furnishes the materials of his Errors, in furnishing him with confused Ideas, and his great vanity gives them Form, in changing the confus'd Ideas into distinct Ideas, and his least conjectures into so many demonstrations.

It appertains not but to the immortal Man, to take away all those faults from ordinary Science, for making use thereof in respect of Eternity, it may be said that he consecrates the least Knowledges in directing them to so great an end, that the moderation which is in the movements of his Heart, leaves a great distinction in his Ideas; that he heaps not up the Knowledges, but that he chuses them; that he trafficks not for time, that which he can make use of for Eternity; that his Heart puffs not it self up with the Science: but that the Science draws its perfection from the relation which it hath with the sublime prospects and motions of his Heart; that his Light instead of troubling Society, procures Good and Peace by the prospect of that Eternal Society which we must have with God; and that in fine he makes not the Honour and Perfection of his Wit, to consist in independancy, which elevating him above the revelation of God,

God, subjects him to the prejudices of Men, or to the illusions of his own vanity; but that he believes to have known all things, when he has known that which it hath pleased God to teach him for his good.

It would remain that we should value our selves for human Virtues, as Courage, Intrepidity, Strength, Liberality, Magnanimity: but this would be to know the Heart of Man but ill, to take them for the true springs of Glory. We would not say, that they came always from the excess of corruption: but we would not likewise erect them for true springs of Esteem.

For in fine, What is Virtue in this Sense? It is a Sacrifice of the lesser passions to the greater; it is for to sacrifice our other Affections, unite Pride and the love of Glory.

Libearlity is not, as we have already remarkt, but a commerce of Self-love, which prefers the glory of giving, before all that it gives.

Constancy but a vain ostentation of the force of the Soul, and a desire to appear above ill fortune.

Undauntedness, but an Art for to hide Fear, or to strip it self of its own weakness.

Magnanimity, but a desire of shewing elevated Sentiments.

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The love of ones Country which has made the finest character of the Antient Heroes, was but a hidden way that their Self-love took for to gain Esteem, Glory and Dignity.

Sometimes likewise it was an Ambition disguised under Honourable and Reverend Names.

The Vengeance of *Cicero*, the Ambition of *Augustus*, the Interest of *Lucullus* had been ill receiv'd of the *Romans*, if they had appear'd under their true form, they must give them for pretext the love of their Country.

There likewise have been occasions, wherein Men having some confused Idea of their Excellence, and seeking natural Grandeur, have turn'd themselves on all sides for to give unto their Actions, and unto their Conduct, an end worthy of that which they thought of their Perfections: but wanting Directions they have turn'd towards false Objects. *Brutus* offers unto Virtue, and repents thereof. *Cato* sacrifices unto his Country, and takes not notice that under the fine name of Country which he adores, he labours for a society of Robbers and Usurpers; and that if the confus'd Idea of publick be glorious in, the distinct Idea ought to cover unto his confusion.

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In a word, there is in human Virtues, a falsity which leaps into the Eyes of all the world, which hinders Men from esteeming them without extravagance. Again, was there more of good faith in the injustice of those Heroes, whom crimes have enobled, and injustice render'd celebrate and illustrious. They sacrificed all to themselves, as if all were there own. *Alexander* is a living expression of this irregularity. After the manner that this furious Prince acted, one would say that he pretended that all things were made for his Pleasure and his Glory, and that human kind was of no other use, but for to serve his desires. He fires Cities, he ravages Provinces, he overturns Thrones, and makes Powers his sport, as if the Nations were but a little dust before him. Is it to be suffer'd, that a Man should make unto himself Sacrifices, which he should have a horror to offer to the greatest of his Gods.

C P A P. XIX.

Of the two last characters of Pride, which are Ambition and Contempt of ones Neighbour.

THE excessive love of Esteem produces another irregularity, which is Ambition, because that the too violent passion we have of making our selves esteemed by others, makes us aspire to all that which may make us appear upon an eminent Theatre, whilst we are confounded with the croud, others share with us the respects of the Publick, we must get out of their company for to draw attention. Our Superiority requires for us preferences of Consideration and Esteem, it is that which makes us ambitious of it.

Every one boasts of excelling in his profession, how indifferent soever it be, and that not because they love the excellency for the excellence it self: but because they would be more consider'd than others. Those who expose themselves to War, love not the great dangers: but distinguish Glory.

But because the distinction which comes of Merit, and of Actions, may be either hid or subject to contestation, or not to be exposed to the view of all the World, our Heart is with Passion ambitious of another sort of elevation, which is incontestable, and acknowledg'd by every one, it is that of Grandeur, of Dignity and Might, according to the remark which we have already made.

Self-love is particularly flatter'd, then when it sees that those whom it fear'd as its Rivals in vain-glory, court it, and put themselves in a dependency on it.

It is enchanted with the power which submits them to it, and loves them so much the more, in that it fears them not as competitors: but the same sentiment of Pride which makes us love those who submit themselves to our Empire, makes us hate the necessity of the latter, which puts them in our dependency, and gives them so great temptation to hate us, that there is nothing but an eminent and heroick Virtue on our part, which can force them to hide their malignity.

In fine, the same reason which makes us seek to elevate our selves above others, not to be any longer in an obscurity, and in a confusion, which hinders us from being taken notice of, inspires us with the
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pent which we have of contemning our Neighbour. We content not our selves with standing a tipstee to appear greater than others; we strive still either to make them fall, or for to abase them for to appear greater by their abasement.

The pleasure ought not to be attributed only to our malignity, which Satyr and Comedy gives us. It ought likewise to be attributed to our Pride. We are ravisht with the seeing others abased, they are so many persons who go out of the rank of those who may aspire to Glory with us: we take pleasure above all to see them ridiculed, because that there is not an abasement scarce greater than this, nor which is more without return, Men having a shame to esteem them whom they have formerly scoff'd.

Whence comes it that Men who never laugh to see a Stone or a Horse fall, can hardly forbear when they see a Man fall, since the one is not without doubt more ridiculous than the other? It is because there is nothing in our Hearts which interestes us in the fall of a Beast, when as there is something in us which interestes us in such a manner in the abasement of other Men, that even the very Image of that abasement affords us pleasure. We think to laugh innocently al-

ways, and we laugh hardly even without crime.

This same Bent which makes us have this contempt for our Neighbour, which is called Insolence, Haughtiness, or Fierceness, according as we have for object our Superiors, our Inferiors, or our Equals. We seek for to abase those more who are below us, thinking to elevate our selves proportionably as they descend lower; or for to prejudice our equals, to get our selves out of the rank of them, or even to cut down our Superiours; because they cast a shade upon us by their grandeur; our Pride betrays it self visibly in this: for if others are an object of contempt, why are we ambitious of their esteem? or if their esteem be worthy of forming the strongest passion of our Souls, how can we condemn them? Should not this be, that the contempt of our Neighbour is rather affected than true. We interview his Grandeur, since his esteem appears of so great value to us: but we make all our efforts for to hide it to do Honour to our selves.

From thence spring Slanderings, Calumnies, impoisoned Praises, Satyr, Malignity and Envy. It is true that this hides it self with an extream care, because that it is a forced confession of Merit, or of Happiness, which we make of others,

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Of all the Sentiments of Pride, the contempt of ones Neighbour is the most dangerous, because it is that which goes the most directly against the good of Society, which is the end unto which the love of esteem relates by the intention of Nature; it is likewise that which renders Men most odious.

When two Men are seen, one whereof shews Vanity, and Presumption; and the other seems not to be able to suffer this Pride, we may reckon boldly that the latter is tainted more dangerously with this fault than the other; for it is not but because he has Pride that he perceives the Pride of the other; and besides, it is a less criminal effect of Pride to presume too much of ones self, than to abuse ones neighbour.

Presumption and Confidence are a sort of Drunkenness for our Soul: but Hatred, Envy, and Malignity are then as madness. Envy is an implacable Sentiment, you may impose silence upon it by your good deeds, and by your civilities, but you shall not bend it; it will live as long as your Merit shall subsist; it will pardon you the greatest injuries it received of you; and at least, time will efface the remembrance: but it
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will never forgive you your good qualities.

Envy and Flattery are two faults altogether opposite, the First shews an apparent contempt for others, which hides an effective esteem. For Envy at bottom is a Sentiment which does Honour, it directs not it self but towards that which it does esteem; it lives by Merit, and dies not but with it; whereas flattery hides under an apparent esteem the truest contempt, since it is born but from the supposition of the weakness of him who is the object. So one may say that there are Satyrs which praise very much, and Panegyrics very outrageous. *Alexander* sees not in the intoxication of his vanity, that the *Macedonian* stiffness does him more Honor than the Idolatry of the *Persians*, he is nevertheless much obliged to his Friends, in that they would not laugh at him.

It is easy to judge by all that we have said hereupon, how odious and detestable a fault Pride is, for all its irregularities are most criminal. The excessive love of Esteem makes us overthrow Nature it self, in changing the end into means, and the means into the end, for since the love of Esteem is no more than the love of pleasure, it is not but a means, of which
God

God makes use for to carry us to Virtue, and to the good of Society; Is it not against Nature that Men should act, as if they were not in the World but for to be esteemed? Presumption blinds us that we may not know that which is truly estimable in our selves; it being certain that that which we are is infinitely above that which we think we are, and that our true perfectious merit much more the attention of our Soul, than these imaginary qualities which we falsely boast of possessing. Vanity which ties it self to the false Springs of Glory, makes us lose the sight of the true and solid foundations of Honour, which are Piety and the Fear of God. The Contempt which we have for our Neighbour, is a Contempt which spurts up necessarily upon our selves, because we are but little different from Beasts; if it be true that we are so different from others, and that the distinction of Pride destroys all the Ideas of our natural Dignity.

But beside these defects, there is one more hid in pride; which is the greatest of all; it is that it makes us usurp the Glory of God himself. Our Perfections are Talents which God trusts us withal for to make them valuable. The profit then which results, is the Glory which we ought to attribute unto him as being his good:

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good : but Pride, Injustice, or rather this Sacriledge which robs all, respects not more the Rights of God, than the Rights of Men. All the regard which it hath for the Divinity, is, that it dares not own the Injustices which it does it, and that it has so much horror for its Sacriledges, that it dare not set them in the light, nor make Reason a Complice. It may be concluded from all that we have said upon the subject, that Pride as well as Corruption in general, is almost equal in all the Men in the World ; in some it manifests it self more, in others it is more hid. All Men do not think equally of making themselves esteem'd, because there are a great many unto whom Poverty gives more pressing occupations : but I know not, if it may not be said that they have all the same bent for Esteem ; that this Inclination may be hid, and that the Sentiment may be suspended : but that it is almost the same thing in all Men, or rather that there is no difference but that which Grace makes. It may be some may show more presumption than others : but Pride is not less in timidity, and in those punctilious shadows of a Man, who always fears, either to do himself wrong, or lest others should do it to him, than it is in presumption it self.

There are People who appear civil and honest, in respect of others: but they seek to get before them in the way of Glory; exterior civility being but to speak properly, an apparent preference which we make of others to our selves, for to hide the effective preference which we make of our selves to all the World. In fine, there are those who are Masters of themselves, when they are commended: but who are not at all, when they are blam'd. Modesty holds good against the impressions of flattery: but it is confounded by the impression of outrages. Pride masters its Joy and its satisfaction: but it cannot command its Grief and Resentment. In fine, there are those who seem to elevate themselves above the esteem of other Men, and who would be, they fancy, angry to share the approbation of the publick, but penetrate into the motives of this chagrin Philosopher, and you shall find that Pride has a great share in him. A Man fill'd with the opinion of his own Merit, finds often that Men do not do him that Justice which is due to him. He must see Mankind upon their knees before him, for to take from him his ill humour, and if he be not adored, he is a Man-hater.

It seems in fine by this, that Pride lives by the errors of others, and on illusions which

which it frames to it self. It has establish'd I know not how many false Maxims in the World, about which all the World reasons, as upon true Principles, and by the favour of which, it thinks to make its pretensions valid. Men keep these errors in spite of good Sense, which informs them of what is senseless in them, because that it is from the disposition of their Hearts that these errors come. For to cure them of these illusions, one must moderate the excessive love of Esteem which reigns in their Hearts; and there is no other way of destroying the latter, than to turn their Soul towards the Eternal and Infinite Good, the only spring of our Happiness and our Glory.

These are the reflexions which we had to make upon our Bents, and our most general irregularities, until we shall have made more particular discoveries in the Science of the Heart, which is so fine, so important, are so worthy of our application in all manners: may it please God to Bless by his Grace, those which we have made in this Writing, and make them succeed unto his Glory, and to our Eternal Salvation, *Amen.*

The End of the Second Part.

ERRATA's to the Second Part.

PAGE 3. line 5. read disposeth. p. 42. l. 19. decrees
r. desire. p. 46. l. 24. r. Taught us. p. 49. l. 4. r.
Loves it self. p. 53. l. 29. for loves r. loses. p. 54.
l. 25. for leave it, r. bear it. p. 57. l. 7. r. affections.
l. 17. r. interests were. p. 67. l. 3. r. *exemptus*. p.
84. l. 19. r. *Achalantis*. p. 90. l. the last. for jang-
ling r. chagrin. p. 92. l. 2. r. fear death. p. 96. l. 18.
for troubles r. truths. l. 19. for troubles r. truths.
p. 100. l. 4. r. seasoning. p. 120. l. 11. for busi-
ness r. baseness. p. 123. l. 21. for injustice r. justice.
p. 136. l. 21. thundering. r. flandering. p. 142. l.
19. r. simplemotive p. 144. l. 3. for they r. we. l.
4. r. confused. l. 11. r. I know not. p. 146. l. 11.
r. of esteem. p. 161. l. 15. r. renounce cupidity. p.
172. l. 28. for practise r. praise. p. 174. l. 1. for
protection. r. profession. p. 178. l. the last. for
abundance r. a bad one. p. 183. l. the last. for de-
sires r. discerns. p. 185. l. 19. r. felicitate. p. 189.
l. 19. r. unto pride.

507, 607, 86, 95, 136
H.B.

105, 116, 151, 148
39, 40, 42, 48, 73,
87, 95, 126, 140x

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